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A central dilemma of social network research is conflicting results on whether 
strong ties are more important than weak ties. This study proposes that “ownership 
type” is a key contingent factor for resolving the strong tie versus weak tie dilemma. 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the effects of managers’ network ties on 
entrepreneurial economy hotels and to test whether the comparative effects of 
managers’ strong ties versus weak ties differ among firms of different ownership 
types. Based on a survey of 230 general managers of economy hotels in China, the 
overall regression results show that the uses of network ties are positively related to 
firm performance. The subgroup analysis suggests that ownership type is a contingent 
factor for the strong tie and weak tie paradox. For private firms, the uses of weak ties 
(UWT) are positively related to firm performance; for joint ventures, the uses of 
strong ties (UWT) are positively related to firm performance; for SOEs, the uses of 
weak ties were negatively related to firm performance. These results are consistent 
with hypotheses derived from agency theory and institutional theory. Theoretically, 
this study provides new insights to resolve the paradox of social network theory 
regarding the relative importance of strong ties and weak ties and proved ownership 
 type to be a new contingent factor. Practically, managers are encouraged to use a 
networking strategy to improve firm performance, but firms of different ownership 
types should use different networking strategies. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION 
Background of the Research 
New ventures face the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Many new ventures 
address the liability of newness through building networking capabilities, because networks can 
offer many benefits to new ventures (Johannisson, 2000). Some studies have discussed the 
importance of owners/managers’ social networks in the entrepreneurial process in particular 
(Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). Quite a few studies have suggested that 
entrepreneurs benefit from their networks in identifying opportunities, acquiring resources, and 
gaining legitimacy (Elfring & Huosink, 2003, 2007; Hoang & Antoncic, 2003).  
Social network theory holds that the patterns of relations between social actors influence 
a variety of outcomes (Stuart & Sorenson, 2005). However, conflicting results exist on whether 
strong ties are more important than weak ties (Bruderl & Preisendorfer, 1998; Grannovetter, 
1973, 1974). Granovetter (1973) believed that weak ties are more important in getting new 
information because weak ties often compose local bridges to members of different groups. 
However, Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998) concluded that actors linked by strong ties are more 
willing to offer help during small business formation.  
Granovetter (1973) suggested that the strength of a tie is a combination of “the amount of 
time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which 
characterize the tie” (p.1361). Marsden and Campbell (1984) suggested that the measure of 
emotional intensity of a relationship is the best indicator of tie strength after comparing it with 
two other measurements of tie strength (the amount of time spent in a tie and intimacy). Duration 
and frequency of contact, both measures of time spent in a relationship, were not recommended. 
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The reasons are that duration tends to overestimate the strength of ties between relatives and 
frequency tends to systematically overestimate the strength of ties between neighbors and co-
workers. Other studies on the measurement of tie strength showed similar results (Marsden, 
1990; Mitchell, 1987). Marsden and Campbell (1984) used a trichotomous variable for 
“closeness,” those of acquaintance, good friend, and very close friend, to measure three 
intensities of tie strength. Some studies have used ties with friends and ties with acquaintances to 
distinguish between strong ties and weak ties (Batjargal, 2003; Lin, 2001a, 2001b; Lin & Dumin, 
1986).  
This study followed the dichotomous tradition and used “ties with friends” and “ties with 
acquaintances” to distinguish between strong ties and weak ties (Batjargal, 2003; Granovetter, 
1973; Lin, 2001a; Lin & Dumin, 1986). Friends are defined as those with whom one has both 
reciprocal and altruistic relationships and acquaintances as those with whom one only has 
reciprocal relationships. Since not everyone has a clear-cut boundary between friends and 
acquaintances and the membership of either group is not static in an ever-changing environment, 
defining strong and weak ties using the ties-with-friends and ties-with-acquaintances approach is 
challenging. Further explanation will emerge in the methodology section.  
This study proposes that ownership type (state-owned, private, joint venture, and 
exclusively foreign-owned) could be a moderating factor that reconciles the strong tie versus 
weak tie paradox. Institutional theory seems to be the most appropriate perspective from which 
to address the different effects of managers’ network ties between domestic and foreign firms in 
a transitional economy (Luo, 2003). Since the regulative systems, normative systems, and 
cultural-cognitive systems are different than those in their home countries for foreign firms, these 
differences can result in different operational strategies for their managers (Steensma, Tihany, 
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Griffith, & Russell, 2005; Chua, Morris, & Ingram, 2009). The different institutional systems 
may affect the use of network ties for managers of foreign firms and influence the network 
effects on firm performance.  
The different effects of managerial network ties of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
other firms could be caused by principal-agent problems. Agency theory indicates that conflict of 
interests between principal and agent may bring company governance problems (Mahoney, 
2005). Because owners of private economy hotels and some joint ventures can pocket residual 
income, they are more highly motivated to spend resources on networking than are state-owned 
firms (Peng, 2000). Li and Zhang (2007) indicated that managers of SOEs may spend much time 
on networks that can secure their careers (their own interests), not on those ties that will improve 
firm performance (owners’ interests).   
Although most studies have agreed that managerial ties play important roles under 
conditions featuring weak institutional supports and distorted information (Peng & Luo, 2000), 
opinions differ on whether network ties are continuously effective with a more complete 
institutional system. After years of efforts to transform from a planned system to a market-based 
system, China has made critical improvements in its institutional systems. By testing the effects 
of managerial ties on firm performance many years after a large number of previous studies, this 
study can provide evidence to support either the institution-based or culture-based network view. 
The information collected during the author’s preliminary field visit showed that managerial ties 
still play important roles in improving firm performance. 
China is a typical transitional economy, where guanxi (network) has been a key factor in 
the people’s social economic life. The recent emergence and growth of the economy hotel sector 
provides an ideal field for conducting studies on entrepreneurial firms. A preliminary field trip 
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has identified different network patterns for executives from firms of different ownership types. 
A large-sample quantitative study is needed to test whether the exploratory results hold for the 
whole population.   
Statement of the Problem   
Previous research has shown that certain characteristics of networks are more effective in 
improving new firms’ performances than others (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Johannisson, 2000). 
Some studies have found a relationship between network size and firm performance (Zhao & 
Aram, 1995; Johannisson, 2000). Other studies have proved a link between network strength 
(strong ties versus weak ties) and firm performance (Bruderl & Preisendorfer, 1998; McEvily & 
Zaheer, 1999). A number of studies have also tested the effects of multiple network variables at 
the same time (Aldrich, Rosen, & Woodward, 1987; Hansen, 1995; Watson, 2007). However, 
most of the studies have assumed the homogeneity of managers’ network effects on all firms. 
Institutional theory and agency theory suggest that, in a transitional economy such as that of 
China, firms of different ownership types may not benefit equally from managers’ networks (Luo, 
2007).      
A central dilemma of network research is conflicting results on whether strong ties are 
more important than weak ties (Bruderl & Preisendorfer, 1998; Grannovetter, 1973, 1974; 
Krackhardt, 1992; Jack, Dodd, & Anderson, 2004; Suarez, 2005). Some studies have tried to 
reconcile contradictory results by using a contingency approach (Elfring & Hulsink, 2003). For 
example, the stage of firm development (Starr & Macmillan, 1990) and the selection of outcome 
variables (Bruderl & Priesendorf, 1998) are two factors that may affect the benefits of strong ties 
versus weak ties. This study plans to test “ownership type” as a key contingency factor for 
resolving the strong-tie versus weak-tie dilemma. It proposes that, because of different cultural 
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backgrounds, historical paths, and governance systems among firms of different ownership types, 
both strong ties and weak ties will be positively related to firm performance for joint ventures 
and private firms, with strong ties being more important than weak ties, while managers’ 
network ties will have negative impacts on firm performance for SOEs.   
Previous studies have shown a positive relationship between managerial ties and firm 
performance (Peng & Luo, 2000), and a conclusion has been drawn that managerial ties can 
enhance firm performance. However, the possibility of a reverse causal relationship has not been 
ruled out. Successful managers should be sought out by more network partners. In addition, these 
managers of firms with better performance should have more resources to build up relational ties. 
The current study tried to address this issue by importing instrument variables.  
Network ties do not always produce positive effects, especially for strong ties (Gargiulo 
& Benassi, 1999). Unlike weak ties, strong ties are very time-consuming to develop and maintain. 
Managers have to spend much time and other resources to maintain strong ties. When managers 
spend too much time dealing with strong ties, they may lack the time and energy to improve 
market compatibility (Peng & Luo, 2000). This means strong ties will not always improve firm 
performance. Under certain conditions, it may become a liability for managers to have too many 
strong ties.  
Purpose of the Study 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the effects of managers’ network ties on 
entrepreneurial economy hotels and to test whether the comparative effects of managers’ strong 
ties versus weak ties differ among firms of different ownership types. The proposed research also 
aims to investigate the effectiveness of managerial ties in China’s current institutional 
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environment. This study intends to discover the optimal strong and weak tie patterns for SOEs, 
private firms, and joint ventures.  
Research Questions 
In summary, the proposed study aims to address the following research questions: 
1. Do managers of firms of different ownership types use different numbers of network 
ties? 
2. Will network ties always be effective in China? Or will the effectiveness of network 
ties depend on the institutional environment of the firm? 
3. Are strong ties more important than weak ties in impacting firm performance?  
4. How does the comparative importance of managers’ strong ties versus weak ties differ 
among SOEs, private firms, joint ventures, and exclusively foreign-owned firms?  
5. Do managerial ties always positively affect firm performance? 
6. Are there any causal relationships between managers’ network ties and firm 
performance? 
Method 
To compare the numbers of managerial ties for firms of different ownership types, a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) method has been used. Moreover, this study 
proposes that two factors (managers’ strong ties and weak ties) may affect firm performance. 
Multiple linear regression is an appropriate method for measuring the effects of several factors. 
To compare the effects of managerial ties for firms of different ownership types, this study also 
runs subgroup regression analysis for each type of firm.  
In addition to the quantitative statistical method, the central theme of the study calls for a 
comparative methodology to contrast the institutional environment as well as the governance 
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structures for firms of different ownership types (Armer & Grimshaw, 1973; Ragin, 1987; 
Smelser, 1976).   
Significance of the Study 
This study would interest both entrepreneurship theorists who might want to pursue 
networking as a source for overcoming the liability of newness and academic researchers in the 
hospitality field who are ready to explore the effects of managers’ networks in the 
entrepreneurial process. Theoretically, this study will test the effects of managerial ties under 
China’s current institutional system and provide evidence to clarify whether network ties are 
institutional-based or culture-based. Many studies (e.g., Yang, 1994, 2002) have claimed that 
China is a guanxi-based society, where network ties have been and will be very important to firm 
performance. However, Guthrie (1998) and Peng (2002, 2003) have suggested that network ties 
are institution-based and that the significance of network ties will decline with a more formalized 
regulation system. The institution-based view has been supported by many other studies (Fan, 
2002a, 2002b; Tan, Yang, & Veliyath, 2009). 
In addition, the study addresses an important paradox of social network research. By 
importing a new variable, “ownership type,” into the model, this study may reconcile the central 
argument of strong ties versus weak ties in this field. It proposes that the extent to which firms 
can benefit from strong or weak ties may differ among SOEs, private firms, joint ventures, and 
exclusively foreign-owned firms.    
Methodologically, this research tried to solve the reverse causality problem ignored in 
many previous studies.  Stuart and Sorenson (2007) argued that social network characteristics 
might not be the cause of such dependent variables as firm performance but rather their result. 
The design of the current research attempted to address this problem by importing two 
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instrument variables: the number of close family members in the industry and the types of social 
media used by the managers. The research design made it possible to confirm causal 
relationships between network ties and firm performance and address the endogeneity problem, 
but, due to the weak instrument variable problem, this objective was not reached.   
Empirically, entrepreneurs interested in starting hospitality firms in China or relevant 
stakeholders of economy hotels would be interested in the study’s findings. The findings might 
help managers in firms of different ownership types to manage their network ties by picking the 
optimal strong tie and weak tie mixes to increase firm performance.  
The next chapter provides a review of the literature and proposes a series of hypotheses 
based on theoretic frameworks such as social network theory, institutional theory, and agency 
theory. These hypotheses propose that there are significant differences among the numbers of 
network ties for managers of firms of different ownership types and that the effects of 
managerial ties differ among the types.   
Starting with the rationales for using survey research, the third chapter introduces the 
methodology of the current research. The process of sampling and data collection in the research 
setting is introduced. Multiple ways of measuring variables are explained in detail. The statistic 
tools used to analyze data are described at the end of Chapter Three.  
The fourth chapter shows all the results from the survey research. The contents of this 
chapter include the sample profiles, the MANOVA results of comparing network sizes, the 
effects of managerial ties for the whole dataset, and the subgroup results of managerial ties’ 
effects for SOEs, private firms, and joint ventures.  
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The fifth chapter evaluates the effectiveness of the study, discusses their implications and 
meanings, and lists questions raised by this research. A few limitations of the study are discussed 
and new directions and topics for future studies are suggested.    
The Chinese and English versions of the survey instruments are included in the 
appendices.  A picture of the survey incentive, a Cornell Hotel School souvenir, is also shown 
there.     
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter is composed of three major sections. The first section considers network ties 
as a dependent variable and proposes that the numbers of managers’ network ties may differ 
among firms of different ownership types. The next section weighs two different views, the 
institution-based view and culture-based view of network ties which are seen as leading to 
dissimilar results. The last section compares the distinct roles of managers’ strong ties versus 
weak ties for SOEs, private firms, and joint ventures.    
Comparison of the Numbers of Managers’ Network Ties 
Many studies (Peng, 2003; Tan, 2002) and official statistics (e.g., see National Bureau of 
Statistics of China) have used ownership type to differentiate firms. The self-explanatory 
characteristic of ownership has resulted in many studies’ use of the term without clearly defining 
it (Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2008; Peng & Luo, 2000; Zou & Adams, 2008). “Ownership is the state 
or fact of exclusive rights and control over property, which may be an object, land/real estate or 
intellectual property” (wikipedia, 2010). “Classic notions of property rights carried over to both 
modern common and civil-law divides property rights into three major categories: Usus, the right 
to use your property as you see fit, Abusus, the right to alter, modify, or destroy your property 
and Fructus, the entitlement to enjoy and employ the fruits from your property” (Gedajlovic, 
1993, p.733).  
 Ownership type as a strategic factor in transitional economies 
The China Economy Hotel Survey (China Hotel Association, 2006-2009) defined SOEs 
as enterprises whose major shareholders are national, provincial or local government and 
government agencies. Private firms were defined as firms owned by Chinese proprietors, 
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partners, or public companies whose major shareholders were Chinese proprietors and partners. 
Foreign firms were defined as firms wholly owned by companies registered in a country other 
than China or joint ventures whose major shareholders were companies registered in a country 
other than China. “Joint ventures are business agreements where by two or more owners create a 
separate entity” (Harrigan, 1988, p.142). In this study, “ joint ventures” specifically refers to 
business agreements by at least one domestic and one foreign owner to create a separate entity 
and the entity thus created.   
Ownership type has been cited as a strategic variable (Gedajlovic, 1993) and some 
studies have used it to classify firms into different strategic groups (Peng, Tan, & Tong, 2004). 
Due to institutional variety, firms of different ownership types have been embedded within 
different historical, institutional, and economic contexts and might select different environment-
strategy configurations (Tan, 2002). The different objectives and governance systems of those 
types of firms may directly affect their firm performance (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; 
Greenwood, Deephouse, & Li, 2007).  
A relational tie is a linkage between two actors (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
Gelekanycz & Hambrick (1997, p. 654) defined managerial ties as “executives’ boundary-
spanning activities and their associated interactions with external entities.” When reviewing the 
network-based research on entrepreneurship, Hoang and Antoncic (2003) summarized many 
studies under a category treating network ties as dependent variables.  
Comparison of managers’ network ties among firms of different ownership types 
Network size is an essential variable for network structure. The size of an ego-network 
can be defined as “the number of direct links between a focal actor and other actors” (Hoang & 
Antoncic, 2003, p. 171).  Among the many studies of network size, Aldrich et al. (1987) tested 
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the network size and compared the amount of network activity between male and female 
entrepreneurs, while Carroll and Teo (1994) compared key network characteristics for 
entrepreneurs and managers. The present study focuses on comparing the sizes of networks 
among managers from firms of different ownership types.  
A common typology of network ties is between strong ties and weak ties. Empirical 
studies have found that both strong ties and weak ties play important roles in improving firm 
performance (Jack, 2005; Julien, Andiambeloson, & Ramangalahy, 2004). Jack (2005) 
demonstrated that strong ties are instrumental for business activity. Julien et al. (2004) confirmed 
that weak tie networks are important for the technological innovation of small and medium-size 
enterprises.  
Entrepreneurial foreign firms (especially exclusively foreign-owned firms) face the 
liability of foreignness in addition to the challenge of newness (Autio, Sapienza, & Arenius, 
2005; Fernhaber and McDougall, 2005). Zaheer (1995) attributed four potential sources of 
liability of foreignness.  
First, costs associated with spatial distance can arise when conducting business 
internationally. A second type of constraint can develop due to the firm’s 
unfamiliarity with and lack of roots in the local environment. Third, the lack of 
legitimacy of foreign firms or economic nationalism within the host-country 
environment can act as a barrier to international entry. Last, firms can experience 
constraints from their home-country environment, such as sales restrictions to 
certain countries or consumer backlash due to political conflict between nations. 
(Fernhaber and McDougall, 2005, pp. 120-121).  
Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) suggested that foreign-based companies lack the necessary local 
connections due to lack of embeddedness (Autio et al., 2005). The lack of roots in the local 
environment also prohibited managers of foreign firms from exploring the benefits of network 
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ties to the extent that domestic firms did. Due to this liability of foreignness, the current study 
hypothesizes that the managers of new foreign firms have fewer strong ties than those of 
domestic firms.  
In transition economies, significant differences have existed among different types of 
domestic firms (Peng and Heath, 1996; Peng, 1997; Peng and Luo, 2000; Wing andYiu,1996). In 
China, many managers of state-owned firms are former officials in the government or from 
parent SOEs managed by government officials (Walder, 2011). These managers’ embeddness in 
the government has provided them easier access to government officials and a longer time to 
develop strong relationships with those officials (Peng and Luo, 2000). Though China’s 
transition from a planned economy toward a market economy has weakened the connections 
between government officials and managers of SOEs, the historical relationships are very likely 
to be maintained for a long period of time. This suggests that the managers of state-owned firms 
will have more strong political ties (political ties were defined as ties with political leaders in the 
government, officials in industrial bureaus, and officials in regulatory and supporting 
organizations) than private firms.  
In the transitional economy of China, SOEs used to be the dominant ownership type for 
enterprises. The relatively longer history of SOEs endows their managers with more strong 
business ties (business ties are defined as ties with executives of suppliers, buyers, and 
competitors) than managers in other firms. Moreover, the SOE reform process led to many 
location-based giant tourism groups supported by regional government, such as the Beijing 
Tourism Group and Jin Jiang International in Shanghai. Belonging to the same parent companies 
brought many managers in economy hotels together with other local hospitality firms. This 
created more strong business ties for SOE managers.   
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Hypothesis 1a: Managers of foreign firms have fewer strong ties than those of state-
owned and private firms.   
 Hypothesis 1b: Managers of state-owned firms have more strong ties than those of 
private firms.  
The Effects of Managerial Ties on Firm Performance  
In management research, organizational performance is among the most important 
constructs (Richard, Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 2009). One study found that almost one-fourth 
of the articles published in three top management journals over a three-year period used some 
kind of performance measure as a dependent variable (March & Sutton, 1997).   
Firm performance and measurement 
The popular objective measures of organizational performance include accounting 
measures, such as earnings before interest and taxes (EBITDA), market share, net operating 
profits, return on investment (ROI), return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS), sales, sales 
growth, and financial market measures, such as stock price, beta coefficient, and price-to-
earnings ratio (Chakravarthy, 1986; Liao, 2004; Richard et al., 2009). 
 A variety of constructs, including those aforementioned, have been used to measure 
hotel performance. For instance, Gu and Qian (1999) used five accounting ratios, including 
return on assets (ROA), and one financial market measure, stock return (SR), as performance 
variables. Chow, Haddad, Leung, and Sterk (2003) chose economic value added (EVA) over two 
commonly used financial performance measures. Total sales revenue was selected as one of the 
four measurements of performance in a study by Huang, Chu, and Wang (2007).  
Some performance measurements have been specifically designed for the hotel industry. 
For example, Claver-Cortes, Molina-Azorin, and Pereira-Moliner (2007) used occupancy rate, 
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gross operative profit (GOP), and gross profit per available room and day (GOPPAR per day) to 
measure hotel performance. Room revenue per head was used by Haktanir and Harris (2005) to 
measure hotel performance. Among hotel performance measures, one of the most popular is 
RevPAR, revenue per available room (Canina, Enz, & Harrison, 2005; Chung & Kalnins, 2001; 
Enz & Canina, 2002; Ismail, Dalbor, & Mills, 2002).  
RevPAR, calculated by dividing revenue by number of rooms, or multiplying the average 
daily rate by occupancy rate, is a standard hotel industry measure for performance (Ismail et al., 
2002; Gallagher & Mansour, 2000; Jacobs, 1997; Wood, 1994). “This indicator serves as the 
basis for long-term business planning and is used as a guide by investors and hotel owners and 
general managers” (Canina et al., 2005, p.572).  
The occupancy rate equals the total rooms sold divided by the number of rooms available. 
This is another popular performance measure in the hotel industry. Occupancy rate can monitor 
the interaction consequences between hotel supply and demand, and it is a reliable measure 
applicable to most types of hotels (Jeffrey & Barden, 2000, 2001; Koenig & Bischoff, 2004).  
One shortcoming of RevPAR and occupancy rate is that they only pay attention to sales 
without considering profits (Jacobs, 1997). Many studies have suggested using multiple 
measures of performance (Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; Canina et al., 2005; Chandler & Hanks, 
1993; Richard et al., 2009; Robinson, 1999; Wiklund & Shdperd, 2005).  
Peng and Luo (2000) demonstrated a link between the micro-level construct of 
managerial ties and the macro-level phenomenon of firm performance. A number of studies by 
others have shown that certain characteristics of managerial network ties are related to the 
performance of entrepreneurial firms (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Johannisson, 2000). For 
Managerial ties and firm performance: the micro-macro link 
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example, research has proved that larger network size will improve firm performance 
(Johannisson, 2000; Lerner, Brush, & Hisrich, 1997). Other studies have found relationships 
between network strength (strong ties vs. weak ties) and firm performance (Bruderl & 
Preisendorfer, 1998; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999).  
Because weak ties often establish connections to incoherent social units and lead to 
original information, they play important roles in information dissemination and can improve 
managers’ efficiency in identifying new opportunities (Burt, 1992; Elfring & Hulsink, 2003; 
Granovetter, 1973, 1974, 1982, 1983; Ruef, 2002). In addition, a diverse set of weak ties can 
lead to capital, customer, and supplier referral, etc. (Jack et al., 2004). Compared with weak ties, 
strong ties are more likely to offer financial resources to high-risk entrepreneurial firms 
(Granovetter, 1982; Krackhardt, 1992; Uzzi, 1996, 1997). The trust between actors linked by 
strong ties will provide managers easy access to resources that are hard to exchange on the 
market (Aldrich, 1999; Jack, 2005).    
A transitional economy has three characteristics: “(a) lack of a property-rights-based 
legal framework, (b) lack of a stable political structure, and (c) lack of strategic factor markets” 
(Peng and Heath, 1996, p.504). With the old planned economy system declining and the new 
market economy system yet to be established, network ties play very important roles in the 
transitional economy of China due to the lower governance cost.  Here, network strategy is a 
substitute for the failed hierarchy and market-based governance structures. (Boist and Child, 
1998; Nee, 1992). In the transitional economy of China, “the social capital embedded in 
managerial ties may be more important in imperfect competition characterized by weak 
institutional support and distorted information” (Peng & Luo, 2000, p. 486). To sum up, 
managerial ties will improve firm performance (Zhang & Zhang, 2006).  
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Although previous studies have agreed that network ties have been a central factor in 
improving firm performance, opinions differ on the role of network ties when formal regulative 
systems have been established. Guanxi (network) is considered a cultural characteristic that has 
strong implications in China for social attitudes and business practices (Park and Luo, 2001). The 
culture-based network view holds that social networks are embedded within Chinese culture and 
will be continuously effective in the business sector (Chen, 2001; Yang, 1994, 2002).  
The institution-based network view suggests that social networks are an institutionally 
defined system and that the significance of social networks will decline following China’s 
institutional change to a market economy (Fan, 2002b; Guthrie, 1998). Peng (2003) developed a 
two-phase model addressing the change from a relationship-based transaction structure to a rule-
based regime. He proposed that, in the late phase, the costs of relationship will increase and the 
benefit from relationships will decline. Firms’ strategic choices will evolve following this shift, 
and the strong-tie-based networks will be phased out.  
Over 30 years after the start of its reform, China now has a more formalized regulative 
system. Child and Tse (2001) summarized changes in three institutional spheres in China: 
government, structure of industries and firms, and intermediate institutions. They proposed that 
“the development in China of legal support for the terms of contracts and of transparency in legal 
and accounting processes will encourage a shift from personal to impersonal enforcement of 
business transactions” (Child & Tse, 2001, p.14).  Ralston, Terpstra-Tong, Terpstra, & Ergi 
(2006) chronologically listed the major institutional evolutions of China over a decade. Those 
changes included the recognition of private firms as an essential component of the economy in 
1997, incorporation of private ownership into the Chinese Constitution in 1999, and the 
legalization of private assets and capital by China’s constitution in 2004. Tan (2007) compared 
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the organizational environment in China at a 12-year interval and found that the environment in 
phase two was characterized by reduced turbulence and reduced complexity. The institution-
based network view suggested that managers’ network ties would not function under a well-
established institutional system. In other words, the relationships between managers’ strong 
ties/weak ties and firm performance would not be significant in China.     
Peng & Zhou (2005) proposed an intermediate phase between the two phases of 
institutional status. They argued that the evolution from no institutions to well-established 
institutions is a long-term process. In the middle range between the two opposite statuses, when 
institutions have been partially developed but are not well-established, firms will resort to weak 
ties for institutional support. That is to say, during the intermediated phase, managers’ weak ties 
will be positively related to firm performance but strong ties will not.  Liu, Huang, and Hsu 
(2010a) found that new firms follow a general pattern when acquiring intangible resources: they 
start by using a mixture of strong and weak ties, then shift to strong ties and finally to no ties. By 
examining the effectiveness of managers’ strong ties and weak ties in today’s institutional 
environment, the results can shed light on these different views.  
Hypothesis 2a: Managers’ strong ties are positively related to firm performance in China.    
Hypothesis 2b: Managers’ weak ties are positively related to firm performance in China.    
The Effects of Strong / Weak Ties for Firms of Different Ownership Types 
Conflicting results in previous studies as to whether strong ties are more important than 
weak ties created a central dilemma for network research (Granovetter, 1973, 1974; Bruderl & 
Preisendorfer, 1998; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Jack, Dodd, & Anderson, 2008). Granovetter (1973) 
found that weak ties played more important roles in getting information. Because a weak tie 
often constitutes a local bridge to members of different small groups, it is more likely to provide 
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new information. Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998) drew a contradictory conclusion that support 
from strong ties was more important than support from weak ties in the context of 
entrepreneurship and small business formation. Since most strong ties are likely to be connected 
and weak ties are not, the dilemma is highly related to the debate on whether networks with 
structural holes are better than networks with closure (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Burt, 1980a, 1980b, 
1992, 2000, 2005).  
Recent studies have tried to resolve the contradictions by importing contingent factors 
(Burt, 2000; Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Elfring & Hulsink, 2003). The contingent factors that may 
affect the benefits of strong ties versus weak ties include the stage of the firm’s development 
(Starr & Macmillan, 1990), the degree of innovation, i.e., incremental versus radical (Elfring & 
Hulsink, 2003), the entrepreneurial processes (Elfring & Hulsink, 2003), the organizations’ 
objectives (Adler & Kwon, 2002) and the selection of outcome variables (Bruderl & Priesendorf, 
1998; Delmestri, Montanari, & Usai, 2005). For example, Elfring and Hulsink (2003) proposed 
that business ventures used more weak ties than strong ties to pursue incremental innovation, but 
that strong ties were more important for firms pursuing radical innovations because strong ties 
could ensure the exchange of tacit knowledge.  
Peng and Luo (2000) demonstrated that the impacts of top managers’ network ties on 
firm performance were stronger for non-state-owned firms than for state-owned firms. Peng 
(2003) suggested that incumbent firms (mostly state- or collective-owned), entrepreneurial start-
ups (mostly private), and foreign entrants used network strategies differently. This study 
proposes that ownership type is a key contingent factor for the strong tie versus weak tie 
argument during the entrepreneur process.  
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The effects of strong ties 
Strong ties provide multiple benefits to entrepreneurial firms (Krackhardt, 1992; Uzzi, 
1996, 1997). First, during the entrepreneurial process, when new firms are in great need of 
support, strong ties are more motivated to offer help (Granovetter, 1982; Krackhardt, 1992). 
Strong ties are more likely to take risks and offer financial resources to new firms when the firms’ 
futures are still undecided (Bruderl & Priesendorf, 1998). Family networks (mostly strong ties) 
can provide unpaid family work and emotional support to new firms. Examples include those 
strong ties providing financial support to owners when business is in trouble (Jack, 2005).  
Second, strong ties build trust among executives of related firms (Aldrich, 1999; Uzzi, 
1996, 1997). Trust promotes access to difficult-to-price resources that are difficult to exchange 
through arm’s-length transactions but enhance the organization’s capability. The trust among 
firm managers will also reduce the cost of designing monitoring devices. The heuristic character 
of trust can economize on cognitive resources, time, and attention during the decision-making 
process without affecting the decision quality (Uzzi, 1997). Jack (2005) found that strong ties 
were used extensively to maintain, extend, and enhance reputation after trust was established.  
Third, the constant communication between strong ties will enhance the sharing of fine-
grained information (Uzzi, 1997).  One benefit of fine-grained information transfer for managers 
is that it increases “the breadth and ordering of their behavioral options and the accuracy of their 
long-run forecasts” (Uzzi, 1997, p. 46).  
Finally, strong ties inspire collective problem solving (Uzzi, 1996, 1997). Persons 
involved will voice their complaints and negotiate over them, which advances the detection and 
solution of problems (Aldrich, 1999). Firms increase learning, discover new opportunities by 
working through problems together, and get direct feedback from close ties.   
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In China, the importance of strong ties to businesses was highlighted by the old saying 
that you had to make friends with each other before doing any business (de Bruijn & Jia, 1993; 
Yang, 1994). Since most strong business ties are based on mutual interests, both private firms 
and joint ventures can reap the above-mentioned benefits of strong ties. Strong managerial 
business ties are ready to provide support when firms need capital and human resources. The 
mutual trust between managers can improve sharing of fine-grained information and enhance 
problem solving. This indicates that managers’ strong business ties are positively related to firm 
performance for private firms and joint ventures.   
Despite China’s moving toward the free market system, the Chinese government remains 
active (Tjosvold, Peng, Chen, & Su, 2008). Strong political ties can provide firms with 
government support, such as subsidies, credit guarantees, and tax and loan write-offs (Peng, 
2000). This suggests that strong political ties will improve firm performance for private firms 
and joint ventures.    
Hypothesis 3a: Managers’ strong ties are positively related to firm performance for 
private firms.   
Hypothesis 3b: Managers’ strong ties are positively related to firm performance for joint 
ventures.  
The effects of managers’ strong ties on firm performance are complicated for SOEs. 
Some studies have indicated that the effects of managers’ strong ties for SOEs follow a pattern 
similar to those of private firms and joint ventures (Child & Yuan, 1996; Warren, Dunfee, & Li, 
2004). For instance, in China, many managers of SOEs are former officials who had worked in 
the government or come from parent SOEs managed by government officials (Child, 2001). 
“Strategic decision making among Chinese SOEs was located within a network of interlocking 
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relationships comprising administrative bodies, regulatory bureaus, and, in some cases, local 
governments”(Child & Yuan, 1996, in Peng, 1997, p. 389) This has provided the SOEs easier 
access to government officials and a longer time to develop strong relationships with government 
officials (Peng & Luo, 2000). SOEs can win government projects more easily than can other 
types of firms (Tang, Tang, Zhang, & Li, 2007; Warren et al., 2004). Though China’s transition 
from a planned economy toward a market economy has weakened the connections between 
government officials and managers of SOEs, the historical relationships are very likely to be 
maintained for a long period of time.  
Hypothesis 3c: Managers’ strong ties are positively related to firm performance for state-
owned firms.    
Meanwhile, a social exchange perspective suggested that actors’ social networks offered 
help to the actors with the expectation of pay back in the future (Blau, 1964). In China, some 
network ties are reciprocity- and equity-based. After getting help from network ties, managers 
always have to pay back later on (Luo & Chen, 1997). Therefore, too many strong ties may 
overload a firm with obligations (Gu, Hung, & Tse, 2008). Hypothesis 1a and 1b propose that 
managers of SOEs have more strong ties than those at other types of firms. The costs of fulfilling 
obligations to and paying back strong ties may exceed the benefits for SOE managers.    
A closer analysis of the strong tie and its relationship to performance for SOEs indicates 
that the possible negative impacts may be caused mainly by strong political ties. Li and Zhang 
(2007, p. 795) suggested that SOEs spent more time and money in networking with government 
officials, because they were beholden to government officials and needed to spend a great deal of 
effort trying to influence these officials. Networking may help secure the careers of managers, 
but it may not contribute too much to venture performance. Many SOE managers’ strong 
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connections in the government often know little about business operation but will interfere with 
firms’ major decisions (Lin, Cai, & Li, 1999).  Government officials may also refer unqualified 
friends or family members to work in SOEs and force SOE managers to purchase from officially 
favored companies, and these activities will be detrimental to firm performance (Liu, Huang, & 
Hsu, 2011).  
In the transitional economy of China, SOEs took advantage of their historical legitimacy 
and faced soft budgets. Executives of these firms were not highly motivated to improve firm 
performance (Nee, 1992). Kim, Oh, and Swaminathan (2006) introduced the construct of 
network inertia and emphasized its constraints on network change. SOE managers face great 
difficulties when they attempt to dissolve old relationships and form new network ties that are 
favorable to firm performance because the costs of terminating strong ties are very high. Too 
much dependence on strong ties creates no room for flexible results and may limit the options of 
the firms to follow alternative paths (Batjargal, 2003; Podolny & Page, 1998; Uzzi, 1997).   
Hypothesis 3d: Managers’ strong ties are negatively related to firm performance for 
state-owned firms.    
The effects of weak ties 
Weak ties are very important in information diffusion since they often constitute local 
bridges to disconnected social units and lead to novel information (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973, 
1974, 1982, 1983; Ruef, 2002). Jack et al. (2004) summarized the issue: a diverse set of weak 
ties could lead to information, discussion and advice, capital, customer and supplier referral, etc. 
Burt (1992, p. 2) stated that holes existed in social structure and “competitive advantage is a 
matter of access to holes.” Ruef (2002) tested Granovetter’s strength of weak ties thesis with 
empirical data from over 700 organizational start-ups and concluded that actors relying on weak 
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ties as sources of ideas were more likely to be innovative than actors relying on strong ties. Weak 
ties also provide decision makers a set of diverse alternatives from which to make strategic 
choices (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). Therefore, weak ties improve entrepreneurs’ abilities 
to spot opportunities because they lead to more varied sets of ideas and routines (Elfring & 
Hulsink, 2003).  
Since it is relatively easier to maintain a weak tie than a strong tie, managers of private 
firms and joint ventures will benefit from additional weak ties because they will have more 
diverse information through them and not commit too much time to them (Elfring & Hulsink, 
2003). Li (2005) suggested that managerial networks have a positive effect on performance of 
foreign-invested enterprises in China. Evidence from the transitional economy of Russia has 
suggested that weak relationships provide greater room for flexible negotiations and may 
improve firm performance via exploration of opportunities in structural holes (Batjargal, 2003).  
A logic similar to that of Hypothesis 3d suggested that managers’ weak ties would be 
negatively related to firm performance for SOEs. In China, the role of asset owners was 
delegated to state or local government, who were not highly motivated to monitor the growth of 
the value of state capital assets (Lin et al., 1999; Ma, Yao, & Xi, 2006; Mak, 2008), a common 
phenomenon suggested by agency theory. The developmental history of the Chinese economy 
during the past 30 years has shown that managers of the more established SOEs have to spend 
much time on maintaining political ties (both strong and weak ties) that are important to their 
income and promotion, because the government has controlled SOEs by appointing top 
managers of these firms (Peng & Luo, 2000). Li and Zhang (2007) suggest that SOEs have or 
spend more time and money in networking with government officials, because they are beholden 
to government officials and need to spend a great deal of effort trying to influence these officials. 
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Taking up many firm resources, these networking activities may help to secure the positions of 
the general managers, but they do not benefit the firms.   
Hypothesis 4a: Managers’ weak ties are positively related to firm performance for 
private firms. 
Hypothesis 4b: Managers’ weak ties are positively related to firm performance for joint 
ventures. 
Hypothesis 4c: Managers’ weak ties are negatively related to firm performance for state-
owned firms.  
Strong Ties Versus Weak Ties  
Peng and Zhou (2005) propose that strong ties are more important than weak ties when 
emerging countries are under a planning-based system. As the institutions move toward a 
market-based system, the importance of strong ties will decrease and that of weak ties will 
increase. This study proposes that ownership type is still a moderating factor now. In other words, 
the effects of strong versus weak ties will differ for SOEs, private firms, and joint ventures (see 
Table 1).   
Table 1 Summary of Subgroup Hypotheses: Effects of Strong Ties vs. Weak Ties 
 
Effects of State-owned Private Joint Venture 
Strong ties  +/- ++ ++ 
Weak ties  - + + 
 
Private firms and joint ventures  
The previous section indicated that, for private firms and joint ventures, both strong and 
weak ties would positively affect firm performance. Nevertheless, the extent to which different 
types of ties affect performance may differ. Actors linked by strong ties are more willing to offer 
help, especially during entrepreneurial processes where the return from the contribution is still 
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uncertain (Krackhardt, 1992) and during critical events when there may be risks involved in 
helping the managers. In other words, private firms and joint ventures will benefit more from 
strong ties than from weak ties. 
Taking political ties as an example, one important reason for the stronger effectiveness of 
strong ties for private firms and joint ventures is the risk to officials for offering help to firms 
other than SOEs. The motivations for offering help to private firms or joint ventures, as opposed 
to SOEs, which are part of the state-owned system, are always suspicious to officials’ peers or 
supervisors and can draw the attention of auditing and supervisory departments. Therefore, it 
will be comparatively harder to obtain support from weak political ties than from strong political 
ties. In this situation, relying on strong political ties becomes a more rational choice for such 
firms. 
Hypothesis 5a:  The positive relationship between managers’ strong ties and firm 
performance is greater than that between managers’ weak ties and firm performance for private 
firms. 
Hypothesis 5b:  The positive relationship between managers’ strong ties and firm 
performance is greater than that between managers’ weak ties and firm performance for joint 
ventures. 
State-owned firms 
Discussions in the previous sections revealed that, for SOEs, weak ties should have 
negative effects on firm performance, while strong ties could have either positive or negative 
effects on firm performance. That is, if Hypotheses 3c and 4c are correct, then managers’ strong 
ties will be more important than weak ties in improving firm performance, because strong ties 
are positively related to firm performance while weak ties are negatively related to firm 
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performance. Liu, Huang, and Hsu (2010b) found that general managers of SOEs who weigh 
strong ties and weak ties differently both thought that strong ties were more important than weak 
ties. One of them said that, in China’s current complicated environment, acquaintances are not as 
reliable as friends; the other obtained many new ideas on corporate strategy from a friend.  
However, if Hypotheses 3d and 4c are correct, both strong ties and weak ties will be 
detrimental to firm performance for SOEs. Strong ties may bring many benefits to the firm, but it 
is very time-consuming to develop and maintain strong ties. Spending too much time on strong 
ties, managers may lack time and energy to improve market compatibility (Peng & Luo, 2000). 
As noted earlier, excessive dependence on strong ties leaves no room for flexiblity and may limit 
options for alternative paths (Batjargal, 2003). For managers of SOEs, even weak ties are sticky 
and cannot be manipulated at will. The reason is that many of their weak ties are weak political 
ties that can affect their careers and many historical and bureaucratic factors are involved in 
weak business ties.     
Managers’ Perception of the Importance of Different Network Ties 
Based on discussions in previous sections, the author proposes that the effects of 
managers’ network ties will differ among firms of different ownership types. Economy hotel 
managers from SOEs, private firms, and joint ventures will rank the importance of strong 
political ties, weak political ties, strong business ties, and weak business ties differently. For 
example, Hypothesis 5b suggested that managers’ strong ties are more important for joint 
ventures. Hence, managers of joint ventures should rank strong ties higher than weak ties.  
Hypothesis 6: The ranking of managers’ network ties will be significantly different for 
firms of different ownership types.  
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Other Factors Shaping New Firm Performance 
Cooper (1995) summarized four sets of variables that may influence new firm 
performance. They are: entrepreneurs’ characteristics, initial firm attributes, founding processes, 
and environmental conditions.  
Entrepreneurs’ characteristics are important factors that can influence new firm 
performance (Cooper, 1995). Studies have found a positive relationship between managers’ 
functional experience and firm performance. (Li & Zhang, 2007; McGee, Dowling, & 
Megginson, 1995). Owners’/managers’ experiences could also affect the survival rate of new 
firms (Praag, 2003).The major reason is that managers’ experience in certain areas may give 
them expertise and skills that will help their firms develop new technologies more efficiently 
than other firms (Li & Zhang, 2007). Brockhaus and Horwitz (1986) found that education 
became more and more important with the growth of high technology and heavy competition. 
Therefore, it is also necessary to control for the education level of managers.   
 Firm size is an attribute that may affect firm performance (Chung & Kalnins, 2001; 
Claver-Cortes et al., 2007; Wu, Wang, Chen, &Pan, 2008; Xin & Pearce, 1996) since large firms 
tend to have higher revenue than smaller ones. Even though using RevPAR takes the size of a 
hotel into consideration, larger hotels usually charge higher prices per room because they have 
more features (Chung & Kalnins, 2001). The revenue growth will not be proportional to the 
increase in the number of rooms due to economies of scale (e.g., the overhead of the hotel could 
be spread across more units).  
Firm age, another firm attribute, could also be used to control for the founding process of 
a new firm (Cooper, 1995; Praag, 2003). At the very beginning, this study noted the liability of 
newness for entrepreneurial firms (Autio et al., 2005; Fernhaber & McDougall, 2005; Xin & 
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Pearce, 1996). Since younger firms need time to establish a stable customer base, firm age can 
affect a hotel’s occupancy rates as well as prices.  
Many studies have suggested that affiliation with a chain can increase the survival rate or 
revenue of a hotel because of knowledge transfer and economy of scale (Canina et al., 2005; 
Chung & Kalnins, 2001; Ingram & Baum, 1997). The field trip experience also suggested that 
network tie patterns differ among hotel chains of different sizes.   
The operation model of a hotel influences its strategic choices (Short, 2003) and may 
affect its performance (Chiang, Tsai, & Wang, 2004). Dev and Brown (1990) suggested that a 
hotel’s efficiency was affected by the interaction of its operation model (vertical structure), 
strategies, and task environment. Hotel chains care more about their owned/leased properties 
than about managed/franchised ones because they can pocket the residuals of the income. 
Examples are not rare in which hotel and food chains tend to operate units that can earn more 
money and franchise those located on relatively unattractive sites.  
The location of a hotel determines its environmental conditions and can significantly 
affect its performance (Enz, Canina, & Liu, 2008; Canina et al., 2005; Molina-Azorin, Pereira-
Moliner, & Claver-Cortes, 2010). As the demand for lodging in urban regions is higher than that 
in rural regions and customers have easier access to hotels located on major traffic routes than 
those on side roads, hotels with better locations will have competitive advantages.      
Baum et al. (2000) suggested that the initial firm performance could be influenced by 
ownership. Studies on other transitional economies such as Slovenia have suggested that 
ownership structure is a key competitiveness factor for hotels (Mihalic & Cvelbar, 2008). Douma, 
George, and Kabir (2006) have proposed that the effects of ownership on firm performance 
differ in emerging economies. Zou and Adams (2008) have shown that certain types of 
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ownership will affect stock returns in China. One important reason is that state ownership has led 
to agency conflicts due to state agencies’ lack of incentives to maximize the value of companies 
(Le & O’Brien, 2010; Zou & Adams, 2008). Ownership types were also used as moderating 
factors that could affect the impacts of managerial ties on firm performance. 
In the next chapter, the research design of the present study will be introduced. This is 
composed of the sampling and data collection method, the measurements for variables, and the 
methods for data analysis.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter starts with a description of rationales for using survey research. After 
introducing the research setting, the economy hotel industry in China, the author describes the 
sampling and data collection method. The definitions of and the ways to measure dependent, 
independent, control, and instrument variables are explained in detail. The chapter ends with an 
account of different data analysis methods, such as MANOVA, multiple regression, ordinal 
logistic regression, and Chi-square test.  
The Use of Survey Research  
Strategies of inquiry related to quantitative research such as surveys call forth 
perspectives that reflect “a deterministic philosophy in which causes probably determine effects 
or outcomes” (Creswell, 2003, p.7). The selection of research method is shaped by three 
conditions: (1) the form of research question, (2) the extent of control of behavioral events, and 
(3) the degree of focus on contemporary events (Yin, 2003). The investigator in this study is 
interested in contemporary events over which he has no or limited control, and he plans to 
address research questions focused mainly on who and how much, a survey method is an 
appropriate choice.  The study of managers’ network ties and networking behaviors calls for 
survey research to collect first-hand data because there is no available data set of information on 
the relevant variables.  
Researchers have been concerned about the validity of applying Western-developed 
management theories in China and have suggested that adjustments are necessary to develop 
those theories in the new environment (Shenkar & von Glinow, 1994). Survey research is a 
legitimate and popular way to collect data on managerial ties (Peng & Luo, 2000; Li & Zhang, 
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2007), but undertaking survey studies on managerial issues in China faces some constraints (Roy, 
Walters, & Luk, 2001). For example, to obtain nationwide probability samples is difficult under 
certain conditions, and some secondary data published by the government are inaccurate and 
obsolete (Manion, 1994; Roy et al., 2001). This study will address those research design 
questions specific to China with methods offered by previous cross-cultural studies (e.g., 
Shenkar & von Glinow, 1994; Manion, 1994).   
Sampling and Data Collection 
The research was conducted in mainland China, the world’s most populous nation and 
one of the world’s fastest growing economies. A report published by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBSC) showed that the annual growth rate of China’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) was 10.3% in 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011); China has 
surpassed Japan as the world’s No. 2 economy in terms of GDP. China plays an increasingly 
important role in the world tourism market. Inbound tourist arrivals in China in 2010 were 
133.76 million, representing a 5.8% growth over the previous year (National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, 2011). China has become the world third-largest tourism destination, overtaking Spain 
in 2010. The World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) expects that China will become the 
world’s largest tourism destination by 2015 (Tan & Shi, 2011). The growing importance of 
China in the world economy has improved the value of knowing the competitive dynamics in 
China because Western firms can learn how to compete and/or collaborate with firms there 
(Child & Tse, 2001; Peng et al., 2004).  
The transitional economy of China provides an ideal context for investigating the effect 
of ownership type due to its richness of ownership structures, whereby state-owned, private, joint 
venture, and exclusively foreign-owned firms coexist and compete (Peng, 2003; Tan, 2002; Zou 
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and Adams, 2008). China is also a transitional economy with an ever-changing institutional 
environment. Informal institutional constraints such as interpersonal ties may play more 
important roles in facilitating economic exchange where formal institutional constraints are weak 
(Peng & Luo, 2000). For years, China has had a relationship-based business society (Chen, 2001). 
The Chinese term guanxi, used earlier as roughly equivalent to the English word network, is “one 
of the most popular terms used to describe social relations among the Chinese people, the 
functioning of Chinese society, and the operations of Chinese entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship” 
(Lin, 2001a,  p. 153).  
The current study will focus on China’s economy hotel sector, which, like other good-
enough market segments (targeting the Chinese middle class), has caught the attention of both 
domestic and international firms due to its strong growth (Dai & Shu,  2007; Gadiesh, Leung, & 
Vestring, 2007). The traditional hotel statistics of the China National Tourism Administration 
(CNTA) have not covered all the economy hotels in China. The China Economy Hotel Survey, 
an official survey conducted annually by the China Hotel Association (CHA), showed that there 
were more than 4,000 economy hotels with about 400,000 rooms in China by the end of 2008. 
The Chinese Economy Hotel Network, a commercial website, has recently created another 
economy hotel chain list. Samples of economy hotels affiliated with hotel chains were chosen 
from these two population lists.   
Currently, a list of independent economy hotels does not exist; the closest substitute is a 
list of all two-star hotels in China included in the China Star-rated Hotel Guide published by 
China Tourist Hotels Association (CTHA). However, the Guide does not have information on 
when these hotels were opened and the general manager’s personal contact information is not 
included. Responses from a few economy hotel general managers in 2010, when the author 
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tested the first draft of the on-line survey questionnaire, suggested that most of these managers 
would not respond to email messages or cold calls intended to collect hotel performance data and 
their personal networking information. Without being referred by chain-level executives or 
government or trade association officials, the author had tried to visit some economy hotels in 
person but did not get a chance to meet with those general managers.  
The independent samples of this study came from two major sources. Through the 
support of an officer working in a city tourism bureau, the link to the on-line survey 
questionnaires were forwarded to general managers of all two-star hotels in a coastal city of 
Shandong Province. Among the population of 33 general managers, 28 filled out at least part of 
the survey. Many of them only provided partial information and a few of their firms are not new 
as defined by this study. Nine valid independent economy hotel samples from this group were 
included in the final analysis. The other source of independent samples is an economy hotel 
general manager training program initiated by Inntie Company, China’s most well-known 
independent economy hotel consulting firm. Twelve informants submitted hard copy 
questionnaires delivered by the sponsor of the training course, and seven valid questionnaires 
were included in the final analysis.     
There are multiple standards for defining “entrepreneurial or new firms”: some have 
defined these as firms that are six years old or younger (Brush, 1995; Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; 
Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000); others have used eight years (Li & Zhang, 2007; McDougall, 1989; 
Zara, 1996; Zhang & Li, 2010), 10 years (Yli-Renko, Autio, & Sapienza, 2001) or 12 years as 
the cut-off age (Covin, Slevin, & Covin, 1990). This study chooses economy hotels that are eight 
years old or younger. Most of the economy hotels in China have been founded in the past eight 
years and are still in their entrepreneurial process.  
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The units of analysis are individual hotels and their managers. The selection of managers 
as informants is based on two factors: first, they are the ones who have access to the hotel 
performance data; second, the top executives are the ones whose network ties are more valuable 
for obtaining strategic resources for firms (Simonin, 1997).  Data were collected from multiple 
sources. Before beginning the survey research, the researcher had collected background 
information about the economy hotels and the managers through documents and records. The 
three major sources are the report of the China Economy Hotel Survey (CHA, 2006-2009), the 
book Economy Hotels (Dai & Shu, 2007), and the Chinese Economy Hotel Network website.  
One major objective of this study is to compare how managers from hotels of different 
ownership types use network ties. To ensure a sufficient number of samples for each type of 
hotel, the author used a cluster sampling method to select economy hotel chains from each 
ownership category and used a certain number of hotels from among the selected hotel chains.  
During the two field trips conducted in 2009 and 2010-2011, the author contacted over 40 
economy hotel chains and met with many chain-level top executives face to face to discuss their 
participation in the survey research. The names of these chains are listed in Table 2. They 
include 12 SOEs, 17 private firms, 11 joint ventures, and four exclusively foreign-owned 
economy hotel chains. This covers all top ten economy hotel chains in China in terms of the 
number of hotels.  
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Table 2 List of Economy Hotel Chains Contacted 
 
Domestic Foreign 
SOE Private Joint Venture Exclusively 
Foreign-owned 
Shindom Sun Moon Hotel Home-Inn Holiday Inn Express 
City Inn Jialihua Guesthouse Motel 168 Ibis 
Garden Inn Piao Home Inn China’s Best Value 
Inn 
Green Tree Inn 
Huantian Inn Weibo Inn Orange Hotel  My Inn 
Kaiserdom Hotel Nanyuan Inn 7 Days Inn  
Donghang Star We Hotel We Home Vienna Hotel  
Zhongzhou Express Jintian Hotel Super 169 Inn  
JJ Inn Yart Inn Starway Hotel  
Easy Inn Jitai Hotels Hanting Inns and 
Hotels 
 
Shanshui Hotel* High Fond Motel Thank Hotel  
Zhong An Hotel* Home Club Hotel Pod Inn  
Hualijiahe Hotel* Sunny Sky Hotel   
 Izunco Inn   
 Weilai Enjoy Home   
 99 Inn   
 Long Fu Gong 
Hotels* 
  
 Jinshi100 Hotel*   
 
Note: Hotels marked with a * are the ones from which the author did not get any feedback. 
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Table 3 The 35 Economy Hotel Chains Participating in the Research 
 
Domestic Foreign 
SOE Private Joint Venture Exclusively 
Foreign-owned 
City Home 3B Inn 7 Days Inn Holiday Inn Express 
Easy Inn 99 Inn China’s Best Value Inn Ibis 
Eaka365 City Comfort Inn Hanting Inns and 
Hotels 
My Inn 
Garden Inn Dashing Hotel Home-Inn Super 8 
Huantian Inn Home Club Hotel Motel 168  
Kaiserdom Hotel Jiali Inn Pod Inn  
Shindom Kunlunleju Business 
Hotel 
Super 169 Inn  
 Morning Inn Vienna Hotel  
 Nanyuan Inn   
 Piao Home Inn   
 Sun Moon Hotel   
 Sunny Sky Hotel   
 Weilai Enjoy Home   
 WHWH   
 You Home Inn   
 Youth Sunny Express   
 
Note a: Property-level general managers from ten economy hotel chains participated in the study 
by themselves, without participation being arranged through their chain-level executives. 
         b: The chain-level ownership types are not identical to property-level ownership types.  
 
The author did not get any response from five of the economy hotel chains. A few of 
these economy hotel chains were uncomfortable about revealing operational data and refused to 
participate in the survey study. Top executives of four economy hotel chains promised to 
participate in the study but failed to submit their responses after being contacted by the author 
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many times. A total number of 35 economy hotel chains participated in the final survey research 
(Table 3).   
Among the 35 economy hotel chains that participated in the final survey research, some 
small and medium scale chains (My Inn, Shindom, Garden Inn, Piao Home Inn, and Nanyuan 
Inn), successfully arranged for all their qualified hotel managers to fill the survey. Some large 
economy hotel chains, such as Home Inn and Hanting Inns and Hotels, randomly selected a 
regional market and some hotel managers from that region. For example, Hanting Inns and 
Hotels selected a northern city market and sent survey links to 32 property-level managers. 
Twenty-nine of these managers submitted survey responses. Due to the rapid growth of  
economy hotel chains in China, property-level general managers are constantly being assigned to 
newly founded hotels. Hotel chains such as 7 Days Inn forwarded the survey questionnaires to all 
their qualified managers who had served as general managers at the same properties during the 
year of 2009, and 42 of them submitted their responses. Two hotel chains, Motel 168 and Super 
8, picked a group of property-level general managers who happened to be attending a training 
class at their headquarters or regional headquarters.    
A key part of the data collection is a questionnaire survey. The questionnaire is composed 
of 33 major items divided into four major sections. The first part is questions on the background 
of the economy hotels and the general managers, such as when the hotel was opened, the location, 
operation model, and ownership type of the hotel, and the work experience and educational 
attainment of the general managers. The second section is about hotel performance measures, 
such as the total revenue, number of rooms sold, net profit of the hotel in 2009, and the perceived 
performance of the hotel compared to its competitors on service quality, guest satisfaction, 
occupancy rate, room rate, and gross profit. The third part collects data on general managers’ 
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network patterns. Questions on the numbers of different network ties, the extent to which they 
use network ties, and how they rank different types of network ties are listed in this section. The 
final section concerns the demographic information of informants (see appendices 1 and 2 for 
complete copies of the survey instruments). 
Following the suggestions of Converse and Presser (1986) and Visser, Krosnick, and 
Lavrakas (2000), a field visit was conducted to develop the instrument. Some of the questions in 
this questionnaire were used for qualitative research interviews of chain-level executives. Three 
managers drawn from the target population were asked to complete an earlier draft of the 
questionnaire and respondents then answered questions on the clarity of the survey questions, 
question order, question wording, and their interpretation of the questions. Adjustments have 
been made based on the comments from these informants.  
The questionnaire was written in English and then translated into Chinese by the author. 
Lack of semantic equivalence across languages, lack of conceptual equivalence, and lack of 
normative equivalence across societies are three practical problems that threaten research 
validity when translating questionnaires (Behling & Law, 2000). The back translation technique 
suggested by Harpaz (1996) and Behling and Law (2000) was used to ensure the concept 
equivalence of the questions in the two languages. An academic researcher who had conducted 
managerial tie-related studies translated the Chinese version of the instrument back into English 
without reading the original English version. The comparison showed consistency of the two 
versions of the questionnaires. The Chinese version was used for SOEs and private firms. Both 
the Chinese and the English version were sent to joint ventures and exclusively foreign-owned 
firms.  
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The online survey method was used for data collection. The questionnaire was posted on-
line and the links to the survey websites were emailed to chain-level executives and then 
forwarded to general managers of chain-affiliated economy hotels. As introduced earlier, the two 
groups of independent informants were reached through a facilitator working in a local tourism 
bureau and the CEO of an economy hotel consulting firm who had initiated an economy hotel 
general manager training program. The primary challenge in using the electronic survey is the 
coverage error or the representativeness of the research sample (Simsek, Veiga, Lubatkin, & 
Dino, 2005). If a large percentage of the population does not use internet, the results of the study 
could be biased. The preliminary field visit showed that almost all economy hotels in China 
offered free internet access to its customers and general managers had access to the internet too.  
The top executives/facilitators of many economy hotel chains forwarded the email 
addresses of the general managers to the researcher when sending out the note asking those 
managers to participate in the research. The researcher exchanged two to five rounds of emails 
with the facilitators to follow up on the survey responses. Afterwards, courtesy notices were sent 
to those who did not finish the on-line survey in two weeks. Whenever possible, the investigator 
and a research assistant called managers in person or sent text messages to collect information.  
PDF versions of the questionnaire were mailed to those uncomfortable with filling out an 
online survey. Eighty-three informants printed out the questionnaire, filled it out by hand, and 
mailed it back to the researcher. To improve the response rate, the author had tried to get 
endorsements from relevant professional or trade associations in order to claim in the cover letter 
that this research was supported by them, something recommended in Bartholomew and Smith 
(2006). However, all relevant organizations (China Hotel Association and the China Tourism 
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Hotel Association) considered it inappropriate to sponsor a personal dissertation study and did 
not provide an endorsement.  
The researcher ordered as incentives 400 pens packed in independent packages with 
“School of Hotel Administration, Cornell University” printed on them. Informants could choose 
to receive this Cornell University souvenir or enter a lottery of offering ¥1,000 in cash (one 
winner for every 30 participants). About 80 informants chose the lottery option and the others 
selected the souvenir option. All souvenirs were mailed to the addresses provided by the 
informants. Using a random number generator, three general managers from Home Inn, 7 Days 
Inn, and Hanting Inns and Hotels were selected from the list of informants who chose the cash 
lottery option, and delivery of the cash awards of ¥1,000 was arranged after confirmation of their 
contact information.    
Milton (1986) offered a sample size formula for multiple regression studies: n=k+1+[t2(1-
R2)]/Δr2 where k is the number of variables in the model, R2 is the anticipated overall R2 
estimated from previous similar study results, and Δr2  is the minimum addition to r-square. The 
priori sample size calculator for multiple regression based on theories in Cohen (1988) and 
Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken (2003) requires a minimum sample size of 207 with an Alpha 
level of 0.05, a desired statistical power level of 0.8, an anticipated effect size of 0.11, and 20 
predictors. The final samples meeting all the selection criteria were 230 in all, which surpassed 
the baseline required by the sample size formula. 
Multiple measures were taken to ensure the conformation to certain ethical norms. 
Survey Monkey, a legitimate on-line survey website approved by the Cornell Institutional 
Review Board (IRB), was used to collect data. The informants were told that the participation 
was voluntary and they had the right to skip any question that they felt uncomfortable about 
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answering. To preserve confidentiality, the survey results were only accessible to the researcher 
himself. The hard copies of questionnaires were kept in a locked document cabinet in an office 
only accessible to people with digital keys. The final results were presented without revealing 
individuals’ identities. All participants were asked to read and sign a consent form which 
introduced the purpose of the study, the informant workload, the risks and benefits, and the 
compensation. Informants were able to gain access to the questionnaire only after they signed the 
consent form. The contact information of Cornell IRB was also provided on the consent form in 
case informants had additional questions about the research.  
In addition to the survey, further information was collected through archival documents, 
in-depth interviews of top executives of economy hotel chains, discussion with leading Chinese 
researchers in the hospitality and tourism field, and participant observation of over 30 economy 
hotels in China. The author read over a dozen books on entrepreneurs of economy hotel chains in 
China, examined the China Economy Hotel Survey 2006-2009 published by the China Hotels 
Association, and visited over 50 economy hotel chain websites frequently to monitor the 
evolution of the industry. The author also stayed at economy hotels of 20 different brands 
belonging to the participating hotel chains, and collected information on facilities, prices, and 
services provided by economy hotel chains. Whenever possible, the author talked with hotel 
customers and front office staff to collect more information from different perspectives. By 
visiting several economy hotels in a cluster, the author was able to compare the service quality 
and competition among economy hotels affiliated with different hotel chains.  
To make arrangements for the survey research, the author met with 20 chain-level 
executives during the 2009 preliminary field visit and 34 executives during the 2010-2011 visit 
(ten of them were met twice). Information about their opinions on the effects of network ties and 
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how they had used their network ties was collected. Many stories and cases related to the central 
theme of the survey study were introduced by the executives. Those cases appear in the 
discussion section of the results of this survey study.  
Variables and Measurements 
Dependent variable 
The discussion in the previous section suggests using multiple performance 
measurements. Both objective and subjective performance measurements have been used in this 
study.   
• Occupancy rate 
Occupancy rate is calculated by dividing rooms sold by the number of rooms available. It 
is among the most popular performance measures in the hotel industry, because it enables “the 
identification of trends and fluctuations within the industry” and provides “a sensitive barometer 
of the fluctuating fortunes of individual hotels” (Jeffrey & Barden, 2000, p. 383). Occupancy rate 
is not always positively related to financial performance, but with no room rate data available, it 
is still a reliable monitoring measure that can be applied to different hotel types. Occupancy rate 
has been used to monitor hotel performance, reflect the result of the interaction between the 
demand for and supply of hotel accommodation, and analyze seasonality (Jeffrey & Hubbard, 
1988; Jeffrey & Barden, 2000, 2001; Koenig & Bischoff, 2004).     
Managers can obtain business through both political and business ties. Therefore, the 
hotels whose managers are better connected may benefit from managers’ network ties and earn a 
higher occupancy rate. Good relationships with government officials can help hotels to maintain 
daily operation without being bothered by frequent inspections from the government.   
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• RevPAR 
RevPAR, revenue per available room, is equal to the room revenue divided by the 
number of rooms available. Another formula for calculating RevPAR is multiplication of the 
average daily rate (ADR) by the occupancy rate. ADR is the room revenue earned divided by the 
number of rooms sold. The occupancy rate is the percentage of all rooms occupied or rented at a 
given time. This study collected data on the revenue of individual hotels in the year 2009 and 
rooms available in the same year and then calculated the RevPARs of each hotel.  
Because some managerial ties, such as ties with customers, will enhance firm 
performance by increasing both the price and the occupancy rate of a hotel, the demand-based 
RevPAR seems to be another good choice for measuring hotel performance. Another good 
example is ties with government officials, which will ensure the normal daily operation of a hotel 
(Liu et al., 2011) and help in avoiding penalties such as ting ye zheng dun (closed while brought 
up to service standard) and therefore increase firm revenue.  
• ROA (Return on assets) 
The ROA is equal to the net operating profits divided by the start-of-year assets. 
Informants were asked to provide data on the net operating profits (NOP) of the hotel and the 
start-of-year assets (Assets) of the hotel in 2009.  
Many of the advantages of managerial ties are related to reducing costs and improving 
profitability. For example, ties with suppliers will reduce the costs of operating a hotel. Political 
ties can reduce costs, too. Hotels can avoid being fined if they maintain good relationships with 
the local government (Liu et al., 2011). The current study has tried to collect firm performance 
data on ROA following previous studies on similar topics (Li et al., 2008).  
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• Subjective performance measurement 
When actual performance data are not available, especially with privately-held firms, 
subjective performance measurements provide close substitutes (Dess & Robinson, 1984). 
Subjective measures proved to be reliable and valid and were valuable for measuring broader and 
nonfinancial dimensions of performance (Dess & Robinson, 1984). Stam and Elfring (2008) 
have used both subjective and objective measures to capture the multidimensionality of new 
venture performance. Similarly, perceived performance, composed of perceptual performance 
and evaluative performance, has been widely used in satisfaction research (Spreng, 1999). 
Perceived performance measures have also been used by many studies in the tourism and 
hospitality field (e.g., Baloglu & Love, 2003; Severt, Wang, Chen, & Breiter, 2007).  
This study used managers’ self-reported measures of five performance dimensions 
relative to competitors. Informants were asked to evaluate their hotels’ performance compared to 
their competitors on service quality (Pservice), guest satisfaction rating (Psatis), occupancy 
(Poccupancy), average room rate (Prate), and gross operating profit (Pprofit) in 2009. The scales 
are from one to seven, with one standing for the worst, two for much worse, three for worse, four 
representing equal or the same, five for better, six for much better, and seven for the best.     
Independent variables 
As mentioned before, the current study defines strong ties as ties with friends and weak 
ties as ties with acquaintances. Friends are those with whom one has both reciprocal and 
altruistic relationships and acquaintances are those with whom one only has reciprocal 
relationships. In general, the emotional intensity between one and one’s friends is higher than 
that between one and one’s acquaintances. Wang and Liu (2002) explains that friendship is the 
result of free choice, while acquaintanceship is not. Friends are selected from the pool of 
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acquaintances, and trust levels are higher between friends. Yang (1994) has suggested that the 
key difference between friends and acquaintances is whether the relationships are dominated by 
emotional commitment or gain-and-loss calculation. The distinctions between friends and 
acquaintances are summarized in Table 4.  
Table 4 Comparing Friends and Acquaintances 
 
Category Friends Acquaintances 
Emotional intensity High Low 
Dominant relationship Emotional commitment Gain-and-loss calculation 
Trust level High Low 
Formation process Free choice Not always free choice 
Relationship Both reciprocal and altruistic Only reciprocal 
   
Two sets of variables were used to measure managerial ties. The first set of variables 
involves “number of ties” used in a way similar to the use in Batjargal (2003).  
• Number of strong ties (NST). The sum of the number of strong political ties and the 
number of strong business ties.  
Number of strong political ties (NSPT). The number of strong political ties is the sum of 
ties with government officials who are managers’ friends. Government officials 
include political leaders in the government, officials in industrial bureaus, in 
regulatory and supporting organizations such as tax bureaus, state banks, and 
commercial administration bureaus, and officials in trade associations.  
Number of strong business ties (NSBT). This refers to the sum of ties with top managers 
at buyer firms, supplier firms, and competitor firms who are managers’ friends.  
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• Number of weak ties (NWT). The sum of the number of weak political ties and the 
number of weak business ties.  
Number of weak political ties (NWPT). This refers to the sum of ties with government 
officials who are managers’ acquaintances.  
Number of weak business ties (NWBT). This is the sum of ties with top managers at 
buyer firms, supplier firms, and competitor firms who are managers’ acquaintances. 
The preliminary field visit indicated that some managers had trouble giving the exact 
number of different types of managerial ties. Therefore, this survey also collected data for a 
second set of variables: the extent to which managers utilized network ties. It combines the 
measurement used by Batjargal (2003) with measurement used by Peng and Luo (2000), Li et al. 
(2008), and Li, Zhou, and Shao (2009).   
• The use of strong ties (UST). This refers to the extent to which managers utilize ties with 
government officials and top managers of related firms who are their friends. It was 
measured by two items, “the use of strong political ties (USPT)” and “the use of strong 
business ties (USBT) .” Seven-point Likert item measurement was applied for both items. 
Informants were asked to weigh the use of network ties, from “very little (with a value of 
1)” to “very extensive (with a value of 7).” The two items were combined for the 
measurement “the use of strong ties.” 
• The use of weak ties (UWT).  This refers to the extent to which managers utilize ties with 
government officials and top managers of related firms who are their acquaintances. It 
was similarly composed of two items, “the use of weak political ties (UWPT)” and “the 
use of weak business ties (UWBT).” 
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Two questions were added to collect more information on managers’ perceptions of 
network ties and the major functions of managers’ network ties. One concerned the percentage of 
network ties used for acquiring financial and physical capital, acquiring human capital and 
knowledge, obtaining more businesses, and obtaining licenses and certificates or passing routine 
inspection. The other question asked informants to rank the four types of ties (SPT, SBT, WPT, 
and WBT) in terms of their importance for improving firm performance.  
For the model, ownership type was a moderating factor, as discussed in the literature 
section. Three dummy variables were created to represent the four types of economy hotels with 
exclusively foreign-owned firms as the baseline. These three dummies are: state-owned firms 
(SOE), private firms (Private) and joint ventures (Jventure). The effects of managerial ties on the 
different types of firms can be assessed by testing the interaction between ownership type and 
managerial ties. Ownership type was also a control variable since the literature suggests that 
initial firm performance differs by ownership type (e.g., Baum et al, 2000). 
Instrument variables 
Basically, instrument variables should be correlated with independent variables but not 
with dependent variables other than through independent variables. Two instrument variables 
were created to solve the possible reverse causality problem.  
• Number of close family members in the industry (NFM)  
This refers to the number of close family members (parents, spouse, siblings, and children) 
in the hotel industry before the manager started to work in the current position. NFM should be 
positively related to both strong ties and weak ties. The major reason is that close family 
members are willing to share their networks with economy hotel managers and increase 
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managers’ connections with those in the hotel industry. The value of NFM is not affected by the 
firm’s current performance.    
• Use of social media (USM) 
Managers were asked to select a few social media that they frequently use: MSN 
messenger, Skype, QQ, Facebook, Linkedin, Twitter, Blog, Xiaonei, Kaixin, Youtube, and 
Youku. The variable was measured by counting the types of social media used by a manager.  
Control variables 
• This study used a manager’s educational level as a control variable for entrepreneurs’ 
characteristics. Five levels were specified: lower than high school diploma, high school 
diploma (HSchool), some college or associate degree (Associate), bachelor’s degree 
(BD), and graduate degree (GD).  Two more numerical variables were added to control 
for managers’ functional experience: a manager’s business experience (MWE), 
measured by number of years in business, and a manager’s hotel business experience 
(MHWE), measured by number of years in the hotel business. 
• Firm size. This research used the number of rooms (numberofrooms) to control for the 
effects of firm size.  
• Firm age (Age). This study used number of years since opening to control for the effects 
of firm age. 
• Chain affiliation. In this study, hotels were classified as independent, owned by a hotel 
chain (Owned), or managed/franchised by a hotel chain (Mannfran).  
• Location. Dummy variables were created for urban (Urban) and suburban locations, on 
locations on major traffic routes (Major route) and side roads, and hotels in large cities 
(large city) and small cities. 
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• Ownership type. Categorical variables were created to represent firms of different 
ownership types.  
Data Analysis 
Hypothesis 1. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) model is a commonly used technique 
to compare mean values of more than two groups. Since this study compared the numbers of four 
types of managerial ties among the different groups, multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was used to run the test. Where a comparison of two specific groups was the 
research focus, a contrast code was added to conduct a t-test between the interested groups since 
it was more sensitive to pair-wise differences.   
Hypotheses 2: multiple linear regressions with dummy variables and ordinal least squares 
regression 
Y=a+b1*X1+b2*X2+b3*X1*X2+b4*X3 
where Y is the performance variable, X1 is the use of network ties, X2 is ownership type, 
and X3 is all the control variables treated as a unit. For example, if we use occupancy rate to 
measure performance and the use of network ties to measure managerial ties, the formula before 
entering the interaction items will be:  
Occupancy rate=a+ b1*UST+b2*UWT+b3*SOE +b4*Private +b5*Jventure 
+ b6* HSchool +b7*Associate +b8* BD +b9* GD +b10* MWE +b11* MHWE  
+b12*numberofrooms +b13*  Age  +b14* Owned +b15 * Mannfran + b16* Urban +b17* Major 
route + b18* Large city   
Treating subjective performance measurements as categorical data, ordinal logistic 
regression was used to test the significance of managers’ strong ties and weak ties. To control for 
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the chain-level unobservable heterogeneities, the results of a fixed effects model were compared 
with those of an OLS model.   
Hypotheses 3-5: subgroup analysis with multiple linear regressions  
Given SOEs as an example, if we use occupancy rate to measure performance and use of 
network ties to measure managerial ties, the formula is:  
Occupancy rate=a+ b1*UST+b2*UWT+b3* HSchool +b4* Associate +b5* GD 
+ b6* BD +b7* MWE +b8* MHWE +b9* Numberofrooms +b10*  Age +b11 * Owned   
+b12*  Mannfran +b13* Urban +b14* Major route +b15* Large city   
If the instrument variables are valid, a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) method can be 
used to estimate the model and results can be compared with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
model. The procedure for running the 2SLS was: first, regression of the use of strong ties (UST) 
and weak ties (UWT) was performed on the two instrument variables, the number of close family 
members in the industry (NFM), use of social media (USM), and all other control variables. The 
predicted values of UST and UWT were saved. Then, regression of firm performance was 
performed on the predicted values of UST and UWT from the first stage model with all the 
control variables.   
After a check of construct validity, hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the 
hypotheses. With only control variables in the model and network ties added later, the R-squares 
and p-value of the models were reported. The importance of each individual independent 
variable could be measured by the scale and significance of the regression coefficients. The 
interaction between managerial ties and ownership type and subgroup analysis were used to test 
whether the effects of managerial ties differed among the three types of firms.  
Hypothesis 6: Chi-square testing  
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The ranking data were used, the dependent variable ranking been treated as a categorical 
variable. Chi-square analysis was applied to allow comparison of the differences among 
managers from firms of different ownership types.  
The next chapter presents the results from the survey study. The results are weighed 
against the hypotheses and the implications are discussed following each result section.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
RESULTS  
This chapter starts with an introduction of the sample profiles for the informants and their 
hotels. It is followed by a comparison of the numbers of managerial ties among hotels of 
different ownership types. The test results for the entire data set are reported to show the effects 
of managerial ties on entrepreneurial firms. Taking the perceived performance measurements as 
ordinal data, ordinal logistic regression results are reported in the next section. A fixed effects 
model is employed to control for the unobserved chain-level heterogeneities. Then, three 
subgroup analyses using a fixed effects model are conducted for SOEs, private firms, and joint 
ventures. A chi-square test is conducted on the ranks of network ties among firms of different 
ownership types.  
Sample Profiles 
A total number of 342 economy hotel general managers submitted their responses 
through on-line survey or hard copy questionnaires. Among these samples, some of the economy 
hotels were founded before 2002 and were not recognized as entrepreneurial firms by the 
definition of this study. Many others were founded in late 2009 or 2010 and did not have usable 
operational data for the year 2009. These firms were excluded from the analysis. A few 
informants only filled out a small portion of the questionnaire and did not offer contact 
information for follow-up data collection procedures; they were also deleted. A very small 
number of responses collected from economy hotel chain headquarters proved to have come 
from people other than general managers themselves, so these samples were not included in the 
study, either.  
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The final sample size was 230, which was larger than the required sample size calculated 
through statistic formulas. The informants came from 52 different cities in both developed 
coastal regions and less developed middle and western regions of China. Forty-four of these 52 
cities were from the top 70 ranking list in terms of city GDP in 2009.  
As reported in Table 5, about 63 percent of the general managers were male, a much 
higher rate than for female informants. Because no manager reported having a lower educational 
attainment than a high school diploma, this category was combined with those having high 
school diplomas. Less than 10% of the total informants fell in this category. Half of the 
informants had studied at college or had an associate degree. The second largest group in terms 
of educational attainment was general managers with a bachelor’s or graduate degree.   
Table 5 Gender and Educational Attainment of the Informants 
 
Variable Frequency Percentage 
Gender  
   Male 
       Female 
 
145 
85 
 
63.0 
37.0 
Academic Degree 
    High school diploma or lower 
    Some college or an associate degree 
    Bachelor’s or graduate degree 
 
21 
115 
94 
 
9.1 
50.0 
40.9 
 
Table 6 includes information on three continuous informant profile variables: age, work 
experience, and hotel industry work experience. The average age of these informants was 36, 
with the eldest being 60 and the youngest being 18. These managers had worked in the hotel 
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industry for an average of 11.5 years. Their average work experience was 15.1 years, the shortest 
being one year and the longest being 42 years.   
Table 6 Age and Work Experience of the Informants 
 
Variable Mean Std dev Min Max 
Age  36.1 7.3 18 60 
Work experience 15.1 8.1 1 42 
Hotel industry work experience 11.5 7.4 1 37 
 
As shown in Table 7, over 90 percent of the economy hotels were located in urban areas 
and less than 10 percent in suburban areas. The trend is that most economy hotel chains started 
from large cities and then began to expand to second- or third-tier cities when the markets in big 
cities became more and more saturated. In addition to the over 70 percent of hotels located on 
major traffic routes, a little more than one-fourth of the hotels are located on side roads. While 
no four or five-star hotels would select a side road location, many economy hotels choose 
properties that are not on major traffic routes to lower property leasing costs. Many economy 
hotels were also converted from manufacturing workshops or residential apartments. About 60 
percent of the hotels were from the top 10 cities with the highest GDP in 2009. These cities are: 
Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Suzhou, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Wuxi, and 
Qingdao. One-fifth of the informants were from state-owned hotels and about one-third from 
private hotels. The largest group, with 100 general managers, was from joint ventures. Only eight 
informants were from exclusively foreign-owned hotels.  
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Table 7 Ownership Type, Location, Age, and Operation Model of Participating Hotels 
 
Variable Frequency Percentage 
Ownership type 
SOE 
Private 
Joint venture 
Exclusively foreign-owned 
 
44 
78 
100 
8 
 
19.1 
33.9 
43.5 
3.5 
Location (urban vs. suburban) 
Urban 
Suburban 
 
210 
20 
 
91.3 
8.7 
Location (major traffic route vs. side road) 
Major traffic route 
Side road 
 
167 
63 
 
72.6 
27.4 
Large city (large city vs. others) 
Top 10 cities 
Others 
 
136 
94 
 
59.1 
40.9 
Hotel founding year 
2002-2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 (Jan to Jun) 
 
16 
12 
24 
65 
87 
26 
 
7.0 
5.2 
10.4 
28.3 
37.8 
11.3 
Operation model 
Owned/leased and operated by a hotel chain 
Owned/leased by another party, but managed by a team 
from the hotel chain and using the chain brand 
Operated independently by the owner but using the 
hotel chain brand 
Operated independently by an owner-hired professional 
manager but using the hotel chain brand 
Independent 
 
179 
 
18 
 
6 
 
6 
21 
 
77.8 
 
7.8 
 
2.6 
 
2.6 
9.1 
 
 57 
Only 21 general managers included in the analysis were from independent hotels. 
Eighteen hotels were managed by hotel chains and 12 hotels were franchised. The rest of the 
hotels, about 78 percent of the total, were owned/leased chain-affiliated hotels. About two-thirds 
of the hotels were founded in 2007 and 2008. Fewer than one-fourth of the hotels were founded 
in 2006 or before. About two dozen hotels founded in the first six months of 2009 were included  
in the study because they had been operating for over six months and could provide the required 
operational data for the year of 2009.   
The average size of these hotels was 133 rooms as reported in Table 8. The range of the 
sizes of the hotels was very wide, however. The smallest hotel, an independently operated hotel 
in Shandong Province, only had 20 rooms, while the largest hotel, an international, chain-
affiliated hotel located in Shanghai, had 472 rooms.   
Table 8 Number of Hotel Rooms 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Number of hotel rooms 133.2 78.4 20 472 
 
Construct validity 
All the measurements of independent variables and performance variables were based on 
self-reported data. Due to the fallibility of human memory, those measurements could have an 
inherit bias (e.g., see Schacter, 1999). Several arrangements were made to reduce the bias. First, 
the author collected multiple objective performance data, such as RevPAR and occupancy rate, 
to triangulate the results. Second, only recent data (performance data in 2009) was collected. 
This would reduce the errors caused by the transience of human memories. Finally, this study 
only used well-established, self-reported measures, which have obtained construct validity 
 58 
through validation elsewhere. For example, the measurements of managers’ use of network ties 
were borrowed from Peng and Luo (2000), and the measurements of strong ties and weak ties 
were borrowed from Batjargal (2003). The construct validity of Peng and Luo’s (2000) 
managerial tie measurements was tested and discussed by Li et al. (2008) following a method 
recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). 
The present study also collected subjective performance data. When accurate objective 
measures of performance data are not available, subjective measurements are the only alternative. 
Studies have found that top management teams’ subjective perceptions of firms’ relative 
performance over competitors strongly correlate with objective measures (Dess & Robinson, 
1984). The section in this chapter reporting the descriptive statistics shows that the subjective 
and objective performance measurements correlate highly with each other.  
MANOVA Comparison of Numbers of Ties 
MANOVA allows the researcher to analyze more than one dependent variable at the 
same time (Bray & Maxwell, 1985). It was used to test whether there were significant 
differences in the numbers of network ties among managers from firms of different ownership 
types. This study collected data on four types of network ties, i.e., number of strong political ties 
(NSPT), number of strong business ties (NSBT), number of weak political ties (NWPT), and 
number of weak business ties (NWBT). Due to the small number of samples for exclusively 
foreign-owned firms, these were combined with joint ventures to form the foreign firm category 
for the MANOVA analysis.  
The MANOVA results showed no significant differences for NSPT, NSBT, and NWBT 
among managers of the three different ownership types. The only significant model was for the 
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number of weak political ties (p<0.05).  The contrasting results shown in Table 9 implies that 
managers of SOEs had more weak political ties than those of private and foreign firms.  
As we can read from the table, on average, managers of SOEs had 33 more weak political 
ties than those of private firms and about 30 more weak political ties than those of foreign firms. 
A diagnostic of the assumptions found that both the original data for number of weak political 
ties and the residuals of the model were not normal. The statistical result was also highly 
influenced by a few data points.  Many commonly used data transformation techniques were 
used (e.g., Log and square root transformation) but did not solve the problem. Because the 
ANOVA assumptions were violated, a nonparametric analogue to one-way ANOVA, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test, was employed. The basic idea of the test is to transform the original data 
into rank data and conduct an ANOVA on the transformed data. Instead of comparing the means, 
it compared the medians of the different groups.   
Table 9 Comparison of Numbers of Weak Political Ties 
 
Contrast Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
SOE vs. private            32.95 10.83 3.04 0.0027 
SOE vs. foreign              30.51 10.17 3.00 0.0031 
Private vs. foreign -2.44 8.78 -0.28 0.7817 
 
The new data in Table 10 showed that the Kruskal-Wallis model for testing the rank- 
transformed NWPT among general managers of SOEs, private, and foreign firms was not 
significant any more (Pr>F=0.14). Furthermore, the pair-wise contrast between managers of 
SOEs and private firms was also insignificant. The comparison between managers of SOEs and 
foreign firms was only significant at the 0.10 level. Because the rank data were sorted in an 
increasing order (manager with the fewest network ties was assigned a rank number of 1), the 
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result could be explained as showing that the average rank of the number of weak political ties 
for managers in SOEs was 20.7 more than that of foreign managers. In other words, the median 
of SOE managers’ numbers of weak political ties was larger than that of foreign firms.  
Table 10 Comparison of Rank-transformed Numbers of Weak Political Ties  
 
Contrast Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
SOE vs. private            11.92 11.26 1.06 0.2910 
SOE vs. foreign              20.71 10.56 1.96 0.0514 
Private vs. foreign 8.79 9.13 0.96 0.3366 
 
The comparison of the newly rank-transformed data showed additional significant results 
for other types of ties. For example, the rank-transformed number of strong political ties 
indicated a pattern similar to that of weak political ties. In Table 11, the results show a 
significant difference between managers of SOEs and foreign firms in terms of rank-transformed 
data on NSPT (at the 0.10 level). This means that, on average, the mean value for the rank of 
managers’ strong political ties for SOEs was 18 more than that for managers of foreign firms. 
This could also be explained as showing that the median of SOE managers’ numbers of strong 
political ties was larger than that of managers of foreign firms.   
Table 11 Comparison of Rank-transformed Numbers of Strong Political Ties  
 
    Contrast Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
SOE vs. private            11.26 11.28 1.00 0.3191 
SOE vs. foreign              17.95 10.61 1.69 0.0923 
Private vs. foreign 6.69 9.13 0.73 0.4643 
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Table 12 shows that the rank-transformed data on the number of strong business ties 
differed between SOEs and foreign firms at the 0.05 level. Thus, it means that the median 
number of strong business ties for SOE managers was higher than that for foreign firm managers.   
Table 12 Comparison of Rank-transformed Numbers of Strong Business Ties 
 
    Contrast Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
SOE vs. private            11.92 11.26 1.06 0.2910 
SOE vs. foreign              20.71 10.56 1.96 0.0514 
Private vs. foreign 8.79 9.13 0.96 0.3366 
 
 The results supported part of Hypothesis 1a in that managers of SOEs had more strong 
ties than those of foreign firms. The data show that this involved both strong political ties and 
strong business ties. Meanwhile, Hypothesis 1b was not supported by the study. The difference 
in network size for SOEs and private firms was not significant.  
The Importance of Strong Ties and Weak Ties: Whole Data Set Analysis 
Both dependent variables and independent variables were measured by more than one 
approach in this study. The multiple measurements allowed the author to triangulate the 
relationships between the variables. For the dependent variables of firm performance, the 
original design tried to collect data on objective measurements such as RevPAR, occupancy rate, 
and return on assets. Data on hotel revenue, room number, and number of rooms sold in 2009 
were successfully obtained, so occupancy rate and RevPAR could be calculated from the 
available information. However, during the data collection process, many property-level general 
managers did not know the assets of their properties and many informants were unwilling to 
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reveal profit-related information. Therefore, the objective measurement of ROA was not used for 
the final analysis.  
Subjective performance measurements include managers’ perceived service quality, guest 
satisfaction, occupancy rate, average room rate, and gross profit compared with their direct 
competitors. A seven-point Likert item was used for each of the categories. Among the five 
subjective items, three were selected as individual dependent variables for the regression analysis. 
The first was perceived occupancy rate compared with direct competitors. The reason for 
choosing it was to compare it with the objective occupancy rate measurement. The second was 
perceived gross profit compared with direct competitors, since it could substitute for the 
objective profit measurement. The last was perceived service quality compared with direct 
competitors, because it could complement those financial measurements. The reason for 
dropping guest satisfaction was that regression results for it were similar to those for perceived 
service quality. Perceived room rate was not included because most of its correlation coefficients 
with independent variables were not significant. Since there are arguments against the use of a 
single Likert item for interval data in running an OLS regression (e.g., Jamieson, 2004), 
alternative ways of addressing this question have been included in the following section.   
Two sets of measurements were collected for independent variables. One set was the 
number of managers’ network ties and the other was the extent to which managers utilized 
network ties. As noted in the previous section, the number of ties was highly skewed, there were 
a few highly influential points, and many traditional approaches to data transformation did not 
fix the problem. Rank transformation has been used to compare the mid-values of the number of 
ties, but the meaning of the regression model using rank-transformed data is hard to explain. 
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Therefore, the extent to which managers utilized strong ties and weak ties was employed to 
measure managers’ networking activities.   
The original survey collected information on over 10 control variables based on different 
theories and previous hotel performance-related studies. The R-square best set selection method 
was used to choose variables to be included in the final model. The variable selection process 
was finalized with the following independent and control variables, as listed in Table 13: 
ownership type, location of the hotel (major route or side road, large city or not), operation 
model of the hotel, hotel size, and gender, hotel industry work experience, educational 
attainment, and age of general managers.  
Table 13 R-square Best Set Variable Selection Results 
 
Dependent Variable Independent and Control Variable 
Occupancy rate UST; ownership type; urban, major road;  hotel working years; male 
managers; large city; operation model 
RevPAR UWT; hotel age; urban, major road; hotel size; age of managers; degree 
Perceived service 
quality 
UST; ownership type; hotel size; age of managers; operation model, 
degree   
Perceived occupancy 
rate 
UST;  ownership type; major road; hotel size; hotel working years;  
large city; degree 
Perceived profit UWT; ownership type;  major road; hotel size; large city; degree 
Perceived performance UST; ownership type; major road; male; large city; operation model 
 
Two potential instrument variables were created for the regression model. They were the 
number of close family members in the hotel industry before a manager started to work in his/her 
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current position (NFM), and the number of social media used by the general manager (USM). 
The rationale for picking the two instrument variables was discussed in Chapter Three. A Sargan 
test was run to check the exogeneity of the two instrument variables. The process of the test is to 
run the 2SLS and obtain the residuals first. Then, the original regression is run with residuals 
included as a new independent variable. The number of observations (N) and R-square could be 
obtained from the model. N*R square follows a Chi-square distribution with the degree of 
freedom being the number of instrument variables minus the number of endogenous variables. 
Using perceived service quality as the dependent variable and UST as the independent variable, 
the total number of observations was 222, and the R-square was 0.0055. Then, N* R-square 
=1.221, less than the Chi-square critical value with one degree of freedom (3.84). The 
insignificance of the test showed that there was not enough evidence to deny that the instrument 
variables were exogenous.    
Using weak instruments leads to misspecification problems (Murray, 2006). A general 
rule of thumb was used by Yogo (2004) to test the relevance of the instrument variables. When 
there is only one endogenous variable, a first step regression F value of over 10 is required to 
avoid weak instruments. The current study obtained an F value of 1.52, far lower than 10. This 
meant that both were weak instrument variables. Therefore, the 2SLS regression was not run and 
the two instrument variables were used as control variables in the study.   
The descriptive statistics of the variables included are provided in Table 14 and 15.   
Table 14 includes the Pearson correlation coefficient of all variables. Table 15 provides 
information on the mean, the standard deviation, and the maximum and minimum values of the 
variables.  
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Table 14 Pearson Correlation Coefficient of the Variables (to be continued) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1.Occupancy 
    rate 
1                       
2. RevPAR 0.42 
** 
1                      
3.Perceived 
occupancy 
0.51 
** 
0.28 
** 
1                     
4.Perceived 
service  
0.19 
** 
0.15 
* 
0.43 
** 
1                    
5. Perceived 
profit 
0.33 
** 
0.30 
** 
0.65 
** 
0.53 
** 
1                   
6. Perceived 
performance 
0.39 
** 
0.34 
** 
0.79 
** 
0.79 
** 
0.85 
** 
1                  
7.Use of  
strong ties 
0.12 
# 
0.03 
 
0.19 
** 
0.23 
** 
0.11 
# 
0.19 
** 
1                 
8.Use of 
weak ties 
0.07 0.05 0.15 
* 
0.19 
** 
0.14 
* 
0.17 
* 
0.75 
** 
1                
9.SOE 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.12 -0.22 
** 
-0.06 -0.19 
** 
-0.20 
** 
-0.06 -0.10 1               
10.Private -0.08 0.08 -0.10 -0.30 
** 
-0.12 
# 
-0.20 
** 
-0.04 0.06 -0.35 
** 
1              
11.Joint 
venture 
0.25 
** 
0.07 0.29 
** 
0.29 
** 
0.26 
** 
0.33 
** 
0.07 0.00 -0.43 
** 
-0.63 
** 
1             
12 .Major 
road 
0.06 0.11 
# 
0.10 -0.05 0.15 
* 
0.09 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.11 
# 
1            
13.Owned 
 
0.11 
# 
0.01 0.09 0.16 
* 
0.01 0.08 0.09 0.06 -0.03 -0.39 
** 
0.40 
** 
-0.02 1           
14.Managed 
or franchised 
-0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.03 0.06 0.10 -0.16 
* 
-0.11 
# 
-0.55 
** 
1          
15 .Hotel 
working year 
0.06 0.12 
# 
-0.14 
* 
-0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.04 0.05 0.27 
** 
-0.10 -0.10 0.06 0.00 0.09 1         
16.Number 
of rooms 
-0.08 0.12 
# 
0.06 -0.02 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.09 -0.08 -0.10 0.07 0.12 
# 
-0.12 
# 
0.14 
* 
0.09 1        
 
  
 66 
Table 14 (Continued) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
17. Male 0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.15 
* 
-0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 0.05 -0.14 
* 
0.11 
# 
-0.01 0.003 0.16 
* 
-0.09 0.13 
* 
1       
18. Large 
city 
 
-0.10 0.04 -0.11 
# 
-0.07 -0.16 
* 
-0.15 
* 
-0.05 -0.03 0.11 
# 
0.02 -0.07 -0.21 
** 
0.05 0.08 0.10 0.01 -0.03 1      
19. up to 
Associate 
degree 
0.06 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.09 -0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12 
# 
-0.08 0.06 0.07 1     
20. Bachelor 
and graduate 
degree 
-0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.003 0.11 0.14 
* 
0.05 -0.15 
* 
0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 0.10 0.01 -0.05 -0.83 
** 
1    
21. Age -0.01 0.11 
# 
-0.13 
* 
-0.09 -0.08 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.35 
** 
-0.14 
* 
-0.11 
# 
0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.70 
** 
-0.03 -0.04 0.21 
** 
0.01 0.05 1   
22. Family 
members in 
hotel 
industry 
0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.13 
* 
-0.05 0.20 
** 
-0.12 
# 
0.13 
# 
-0.01 -0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.09 -0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.02 1  
23. Use of 
social media 
0.08 -0.08 0.12 
# 
0.10 0.08 0.10 0.18 
** 
0.17 
** 
-0.12 
# 
0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.27 
** 
0.00 -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 0.10 -0.34 
** 
0.03 1 
 
Note: Significance levels: ** <0.01;   * <0.05;   # <0.10 
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Table 15   Means and Standard Deviations for Independent Variables 
 
 Occupancy Rate RevPAR Perceived 
Service 
Perceived Profit 
 N Mean  
(Std Dev) 
N Mean  
(Std Dev) 
N Mean  
(Std Dev) 
N Mean  
(Std Dev) 
Use of strong ties 
230 
3.23 
(1.62) 229 
3.24 
(1.62) 228 
3.25 
(1.62) 226 
3.24 
(1.61) 
Use of weak ties 
230 
3.21 
(1.55) 229 
3.21 
(1.55) 228 
3.23 
(1.55) 226 
3.22 
(1.56) 
SOE 
230 
0.19 
(0.39) 229 
0.19 
(0.39) 228 
0.19 
(0.40) 226 
0.19 
(0.39) 
Private 
230 
0.34 
(0.47) 229 
0.34 
(0.47) 228 
0.34 
(0.47) 226 
0.34 
(0.47) 
Joint venture 
230 
0.43 
(0.50) 229 
0.44 
(0.50) 228 
0.43 
(0.50) 226 
0.44 
(0.50) 
Major road 
230 
0.73 
(0.45) 229 
0.72 
(0.45) 228 
0.73 
(0.45) 226 
0.73 
(0.44) 
Owned 
230 
0.78 
(0.42) 229 
0.78 
(0.41) 228 
0.78 
(0.42) 226 
0.77 
(0.42) 
Managed or 
franchised 230 
 
0.08 
(0.27) 229 
 
0.08 
(0.27) 228 
 
0.08 
(0.27) 226 
 
0.08 
(0.27) 
Hotel working year 
229 
11.49 
(7.44) 229 
11.49 
(7.44) 227 
11.47 
(7.44) 225 
11.39 
(7.39) 
Number of rooms 
230 
133.16 
(78.38) 229 
133.18 
(78.55) 228 
133.43 
(78.61) 226 
133.88 
(78.79) 
Male 
230 
0.63 
(0.48) 229 
0.63 
(0.48) 228 
0.63 
(0.48) 226 
0.63 
(0.48) 
Large city 
230 
0.59 
(0.49) 229 
0.59 
(0.49) 228 
0.60 
(0.49) 226 
0.60 
(0.49) 
Up to associate 
degree 
230 
  
0.50 
(0.50) 229 
 
0.50 
(0.50) 228 
 
0.50 
(0.50) 226 
 
0.50 
(0.50) 
Bachelor and 
graduate degree 230 
0.41 
(0.49) 229 
0.41 
(0.49) 228 
0.41 
(0.49) 226 
0.42 
(0.49) 
Age 
230 
36.14 
(7.27) 229 
36.14 
(7.29) 228 
36.16 
(7.29) 226 
36.14 
(7.28) 
Family members in 
hotel industry 226 
0.81 
(1.25) 225 
0.81 
(1.25) 224 
0.82 
(1.25) 222 
0.82 
(1.26) 
Use of social media 
230 
1.96 
(1.03) 229 
1.97 
(1.03) 228 
1.97 
(1.03) 226 
1.97 
(1.03) 
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Subjective performance measurements 
Due to the fact that multiple dependent variables were used, a multivariate multiple regression 
was run to test the significance of the models. The results of the regression analysis using 
perceived service quality as a dependent variable are listed in Table 16.  
For each independent variable, four different models were run to compare the 
effectiveness of UST and UWT. The first one is the baseline model with only control variables. 
The second model adds one independent variable UST and the third model adds the other 
independent variable UWT to the baseline model. In the fourth model, both UST and UWT are 
added.  All succeeding tables reporting regression results follow a similar pattern.      
As seen in Table 16, manager’s use of network ties was positively related to the 
subjective measurement of perceived service quality compared with direct competitors. This 
result is consistent with many previous studies and supports the social network theory claim that 
the social capital embedded in the background and connections of managers can help to improve 
firm performance. When perceived service quality was the dependent variable, both strong ties 
and weak ties were significant, supporting Hypotheses 2a and 2b that both managers’ strong ties 
and weak ties were positively related to firm performance. The data from Models 16-2 and 16-3 
showed that an additional unit increase of using strong ties would increase the perceived service 
quality compared with direct competitors by 0.14 unit. For weak ties, it will increase by 0.13 unit.  
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Table 16 The Effects of Network Ties on Perceived Service Quality  
 
 DV=Perceived Service Quality  
 Model 1 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 3 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 4 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Use of strong ties (UST)  0.14** 
(0.04) 
 0.10 
(0.06) 
Use of weak ties (UWT)   0.13** 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
SOE -0.59 
(0.41) 
-0.57 
(0.40) 
-0.51 
(0.41) 
-0.54 
(0.41) 
Private -1.12** 
(0.40) 
-1.16** 
(0.39) 
-1.15** 
(0.39) 
-1.16** 
(0.39) 
Joint 
venture 
-0.22 
(0.38) 
-0.24 
(0.37) 
-0.17 
(0.38) 
-0.21 
(0.37) 
Major road -0.08 
(0.16) 
-0.08 
(0.16) 
-0.08 
(0.16) 
-0.08 
(0.16) 
Owned 0.15 
(0.23) 
0.13 
(0.22) 
0.08 
(0.23) 
0.11 
(0.23) 
Managed or franchised 0.27 
(0.32) 
0.34 
(0.31) 
0.26 
(0.31) 
0.32 
(0.31) 
Hotel working year 0.0003 
(0.01) 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
0.0007 
(0.01) 
Number of rooms -0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.0006 
(0.001) 
-0.0006 
(0.001) 
-0.0006 
(0.001) 
Male -0.46** 
(0.15) 
-0.41** 
(0.15) 
-0.41** 
(0.15) 
-0.40** 
(0.15) 
Large city -0.11 
(0.15) 
-0.08 
(0.15) 
-0.09 
(0.15) 
-0.08 
(0.15) 
Up to associate degree -0.01 
(0.28) 
-0.13 
(0.28) 
-0.13 
(0.28) 
-0.15 
(0.28) 
Bachelor and graduate degree -0.06 
(0.29) 
-0.21 
(0.29) 
-0.24 
(0.29) 
-0.25 
(0.29) 
Age -0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
Family members in hotel 
industry 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
Use of social media 0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
Model F 3.19 3.74 3.62 3.56 
P< 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
R-square 0.192 0.229 0.224 0.232 
Model df 15 16 16 17 
 
Note a: Sample size is 218. 
         b: significance levels: ** <0.01;   * <0.05;   # <0.10 
 
When running the regression model and testing the assumptions, the author found that 
UST and UWT highly correlated. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the two was 0.75. 
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When one of them was added into the model separately, either one or the other was significant. 
When both UST and UWT were added into the model, neither was significant. This was caused 
by multicolinearity. However, many regression results from the present study also showed 
differences between the UST and UWT. Under certain conditions (e.g., using perceived 
occupancy rate as a dependent variable), only the UST was significant, and under other 
conditions (e.g., using perceived profit as a dependent variable), only the UWT was significant, 
proving they were not identical and could not substitute for one another.  
In these different models, some control variables were also significant. For instance, in 
Models 16-2 and 16-3, the variable private was significant. This means that the service quality 
perceived by the managers was significantly worse for private economy hotels than for 
exclusively foreign-owned ones. This could be due to the fact that exclusively foreign-owned 
economy hotels in China belong to international hotel chains with decades of history and 
experience. They follow very strict quality standards and service procedures. Almost all these 
foreign-owned economy hotel brands are affiliated with a large hotel group with multiple brands. 
Poor services of one brand may damage the reputation and image of other brands from the same 
group. For example, a top executive of an exclusively foreign-owned economy hotel chain 
revealed that their primary objective in building economy hotels in China was to recruit members 
and form a potential customer base for its other leisure products. Maintaining high service 
standards is key to their strategic goals in China. Nevertheless, most private economy hotels are 
new players in this segment and not all of them have developed and maintained high service 
standards.   
Also in these two models, the coefficients of the variable “male” were negative and 
significant, suggesting that the perceived service qualities of hotels with male managers were not 
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as good as those of hotels with female managers. It could be that, on average, female managers 
take care of services better than male managers. However, since the dependent variable was 
measured by perceived service quality, the result could also mean that female managers were 
more optimistic about their hotel services. 
Likert items were treated as interval data and parametric analytic tools were used in the 
previous sections. However, this procedure was considered problematic by some researchers 
(Clason & Dormody, 1994; Jamieson, 2004). Whether a single Likert item can be used for 
interval data and subject to parametric analysis tools has long been debated (Armstrong, 1981, 
1984; Knapp, 1984, 1990). Some have insisted that data measured by Likert items can only be 
treated as ordinal data and cannot be subject to arithmetical manipulations such as calculating the 
means. The reason is that the values falling into the middle of integers have no meaning and the 
intervals between two neighboring points are not equal. Because subjective dependent variables 
can only be expressed as whole numbers one through seven, the regression residual plots for 
some models showed patterns, indicating that residuals were not independent of each other. 
Others have suggested that a single Likert item can be used for interval data as long as certain 
rules are followed. Some studies have shown that it does not matter much empirically when an 
ordinal scale is treated as interval one (Labovitz, 1967).  
If a stricter rule is followed, two additional analyses can be conducted to address the 
problem. One is to combine the multiple subjective performance items into one overall 
subjective performance measurement. The author used principle component analysis to 
determine the dimensions of the five subjective performance measurement items. Only one 
Eigenvalue was over 1, suggesting a single dimension to the measurement. The Eigenvectors 
coefficients from the process were used to combine the items. Perceived performance = 0.45 
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Service quality + 0.46 Customer satisfaction + 0.43 Occupancy rate + 0.43 Rate + 0.46 Profit. 
The multiple linear regression was then performed using the newly created perceived 
performance measurement.  
With perceived performance as the dependent variable, the regression result is very 
similar to that with perceived service quality. The data from Models 17-2 and 17-3 showed that, 
when managers used an additional unit of strong ties, the perceived performance compared with 
direct competitors would increase by 0.20 unit. For weak ties, it would increase by 0.21 unit.  
Another way to deal with the methodological argument is to take the individual Likert 
items as ordinal data and use models specifically designed for this type of data. The results of 
ordinal logistic regression are shown in Table 18. Both UST and UWT are positively related to 
firm performance, supporting Hypothesis 2a and 2b. Taking Model 18-4 as an example, UST 
was significant at a 0.01 level and the regression coefficient for UST is 0.25. This means that 
each additional unit use of strong ties increased the odds of being in a higher category of 
perceived quality by about 25%.  
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Table 17 The Effects of Network Ties on Perceived Performance 
 
 DV=Perceived Performance  
Model 1 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 3 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 4 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
UST  0.20* 
(0.09) 
 0.12  
(0.13) 
UWT   0.21* 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.14) 
SOE -0.65 
(0.83) 
-0.62 
(0.82) 
-0.53 
(0.82) 
-0.56 
(0.82) 
Private -0.72 
(0.80) 
-0.78 
(0.80) 
-0.76 
(0.80) 
-0.78 
(0.80) 
Joint venture 0.85 
(0.77) 
0.83 
(0.76) 
0.93 
(0.76) 
0.88 
(0.76) 
Major road 0.50 
(0.33) 
0.50 
(0.32) 
0.49 
(0.32) 
0.49 
(0.32) 
Owned -0.07 
(0.46) 
-0.09 
(0.45) 
-0.17 
(0.46) 
-0.14 
(0.46) 
Managed or franchised 0.34 
(0.64) 
0.46 
(0.63) 
0.33 
(0.63) 
0.40 
(0.63) 
Hotel 
working year 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
Number of hotel rooms 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Male -0.63* 
(0.31) 
-0.57# 
(0.30) 
-0.56# 
(0.30) 
-0.55# 
(0.30) 
Large city -0.51# 
(0.30) 
-0.45 
(0.30) 
-0.47 
(0.30) 
-0.45 
(0.30) 
Up to associate degree 0.31 
(0.57) 
0.14 
(0.57) 
0.12 
(0.57) 
0.10 
(0.57) 
Bachelor and graduate degree 0.06 
(0.58) 
-0.16 
(0.58) 
-0.23 
(0.59) 
-0.23 
(0.59) 
Age -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.004 
(0.03) 
-0.005 
(0.03) 
Family members in hotel industry 0.07 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
Use of social media 0.09 
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
Model F 2.90 3.11 3.09 2.96 
P< 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
R-square 0.177 0.198 0.198 0.201 
Model df 15 16 16 17 
Note a: Sample size is 218. 
         b: Significance levels: ** <0.01;   * <0.05;   # <0.10 
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Table 18 Ordinal Logistic Regression: Perceived Service Quality as a Dependent Variable  
 
 DV=Perceived Service Quality  
 Model 1 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 3 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 4 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
UST  0.28** 
(0.08) 
 0.25** 
(0.12) 
UWT   0.24** 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.13) 
SOE -1.29# 
(0.77) 
-1.32# 
(0.77) 
-1.24 
(0.77) 
-1.31# 
(0.78) 
Private -2.09** 
(0.76) 
-2.25** 
(0.76) 
-2.25** 
(0.76) 
-2.27** 
(0.76) 
Joint 
venture 
-0.47 
(0.71) 
-0.52 
(0.71) 
-0.47 
(0.71) 
-0.52 
(0.71) 
Major road -0.10 
(0.30) 
-0.07 
(0.30) 
-0.09 
(0.30) 
-0.07 
(0.30) 
Owned 0.03 
(0.42) 
-0.09 
(0.42) 
-0.12 
(0.42) 
-0.11 
(0.42) 
Managed or franchised 0.68 
(0.59) 
0.74 
(0.59) 
0.62 
(0.59) 
0.72 
(0.60) 
Hotel working year 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
0.003 
(0.03) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
Number of rooms -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
Male -0.88** 
(0.28) 
-0.78** 
(0.28) 
-0.79** 
(0.28) 
-0.78** 
(0.28) 
Large city -0.22 
(0.27) 
-0.12 
(0.28) 
-0.17 
(0.27) 
-0.12 
(0.28) 
Up to associate degree 0.30 
(0.50) 
0.04 
(0.51) 
0.08 
(0.51) 
0.02 
(0.51) 
Bachelor and graduate degree 0.11 
(0.51) 
-0.21 
(0.52) 
-0.20 
(0.52) 
-0.24 
(0.52) 
Age -0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Family members in hotel 
industry 
0.08 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
Use of social media 0.06 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
Model Chi-Square 39.69 48.88 45.49 49.00 
P< 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
R-square 0.179 0.222 0.208 0.223 
Model df 15 16 16 17 
Note a: Sample size is 223. 
         b: Significance levels: ** <0.01;   * <0.05;   # <0.10 
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Objective performance measurements 
For two objective performance measurements, occupancy rate and RevPAR, neither UST  
nor UWT was significant. When a refined measurement, the use of strong political ties (USPT), 
was used, it was positively related to firm performance. This is consistent with previous findings 
that strong ties are more willing to offer help during entrepreneurial processes and political ties 
are key to firm performance in a transitional economy.  
The regression showed that the use of strong political ties was positively related to 
revenue per available room. The model was significant at the 0.10 level and the regression 
coefficient was 6.11 for USPT. This means that, for those managers who used one additional unit 
of strong political ties, the RevPAR of their economy hotels would increase by 6.11RMB.  
 
The whole data set regression results are summarized in Table 19. The results support a 
conclusion in previous studies that the use of dependent variables could be a contingent factor 
for the strong and weak tie paradox (Bruderl & Priesendorf, 1998; Delmestri et al., 2005; Park & 
Luo, 2001). Park and Luo (2001) found that guanxi utilization could lead to higher sales growth, 
but had no effect on profit growth. In this study, when performance was measured by occupancy 
rate, neither strong ties nor weak ties were significant. When the dependent variable was 
measured by RevPAR and Perceived occupancy rate, only strong ties were important, supporting 
Hypothesis 2a.  When measuring performance by perceived gross profit, only weak ties were 
important, supporting Hypothesis 2b. Using perceived service qualities and perceived 
performance, both strong ties and weak ties were important, supporting both Hypotheses 2a and 
2b.  
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Table 19 Effects of Managers’ Network Ties on Firm Performance: OLS Model Results 
 
Types of 
Ties 
Occupancy 
Rate 
RevPAR Perceived 
Occupancy 
Perceived 
Services 
Perceived 
Profit  
Perceived 
Performance 
Strong 
ties 
 +(SPT) 
.10 level 
+ +   + 
Weak 
ties 
   +  + 
.10 level 
+ 
 
The fixed effects model  
Since the final 230 valid samples came from 30 economy hotel chains, the effects of 
strong ties and weak ties could be affected by unobserved chain-level heterogeneities. By using 
the Generalized Linear Model (GLM) with chain dummies, we can rule out the effects of those 
unobserved chain-level heterogeneities. The results for the fixed effects model are shown in 
Table 20.  
After adding chain dummies, the previously significant variable, the use of weak ties, 
becomes insignificant. The use of strong ties is significant, but only at a 0.10 level. One reason is 
that the new model only uses within-group variance and drops the inter-group variance for the 
analysis. Adding a large number of dummy variables also causes a loss of degrees of freedom 
and may turn significant models into insignificant ones.   
The fixed effects models using other performance measurements are not significant. The 
results are summarized in Table 21.   
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Table 20 Effects of Manager’s Network Ties on Perceived Service Quality:  
The Fixed Effects Model  
 
 DV=Perceived Service Quality  
 Model 1 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 3 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 4 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
UST  0.09# 
(0.05) 
 0.09 
(0.06) 
UWT   0.06 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
SOE -0.60 
(0.82) 
-0.65 
(0.81) 
-0.50 
(0.82) 
-0.65 
(0.83) 
Private -1.66* 
(0.78) 
-1.76* 
(0.77) 
-1.61* 
(0.77) 
-1.76* 
(0.78) 
Joint 
venture 
-0.46 
(0.83) 
-0.64 
(0.83) 
-0.44 
(0.83) 
-0.64 
(0.84) 
Major road 0.02 
(0.16) 
-0.01 
(0.16) 
-0.003 
(0.16) 
-0.01 
(0.16) 
Owned -0.44 
(0.42) 
-0.43 
(0.42) 
-0.45 
(0.42) 
-0.43 
(0.42) 
Managed or franchised -0.56 
(0.42) 
-0.51 
(0.41) 
-0.54 
(0.41) 
-0.51 
(0.41) 
Hotel working year 0.003 
(0.01) 
0.0002 
(0.01) 
0.0008 
(0.01) 
0.0002 
(0.01) 
Number of rooms <-0.0001 
(0.001) 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
-0.00004 
(0.001) 
-0.00007 
(0.001) 
Male -0.47** 
(0.15) 
-0.43** 
(0.15) 
-0.46** 
(0.15) 
-0.43** 
(0.15) 
Large city 0.08 
(0.17) 
0.09 
(0.17) 
0.08 
(0.17) 
0.09 
(0.17) 
Up to associate degree -0.04 
(0.34) 
-0.14 
(0.34) 
-0.12 
(0.34) 
-0.14 
(0.34) 
Bachelor and graduate degree -0.06 
(0.34) 
-0.19 
(0.34) 
-0.18 
(0.35) 
-0.19 
(0.35) 
Age -0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
Family members in hotel industry 0.07 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
Use of social media -0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
Model F 2.89 2.95 2.88 2.87 
P< 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
R-square 0.417 0.429 0.422 0.429 
Model df 44 45 45 46 
Note a: Sample size is 223. 
         b: Significance levels: ** <0.01;   * <0.05;   # <0.10 
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Table 21 Effects of Managers’ Network Ties on Firm Performance: Fixed Effects Models  
 
Types of 
Ties 
Occupancy 
Rate 
RevPAR Perceived 
Occupancy 
Perceived 
Services 
Perceived 
Profit  
Perceived 
Performance 
Strong ties    +  
.10 level 
  
Weak ties       
 
When the interaction terms between the use of network ties and ownership types were 
added, both the interaction terms and the original UST and UWT became insignificant. One 
reason could be the high multicolinearity among the variables. A subgroup analysis was used 
instead of regression with the interaction to compare the effects of network ties for managers in 
firms of different ownership types.  
The Importance of Strong Ties and Weak Ties: The Subgroup Analysis 
All the subgroup analyses were conducted using the fixed effects models. In other words, 
chain dummies were added into the model to control for the unobserved chain-level 
heterogeneities. Due to the small sample number of the exclusively foreign-owned hotels, it was 
not possible to conduct a subgroup analysis on this group. Therefore, comparisons of this group 
with other ownership types are not provided by this study.   
Private firms 
None of the models using objective performance measurements was significant for the 
private subgroup. The use of network ties was only significant in a few subjective performance 
models (e.g., perceived service quality, perceived profit, and perceived performance). In these 
models, only the UWT was significant, supporting Hypothesis 4a, which suggested that weak 
ties would be positively related to firm performance for private firms. Hypothesis 3a, which 
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proposed that the use of strong ties would be positively related to firm performance for private 
firms, was not supported (see Table 22).  
Table 22 Effects of Managers’ Network Ties on Perceived Service Quality and  
Perceived Performance: Results for Private Firms 
 DV=Perceived Service Quality  DV=Perceived Performance  
 Model 1 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 3 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 4 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 5 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 6 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 7 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 8 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
UST  0.003 
(0.10) 
 -0.18 
(0.11) 
 0.07 
(0.20) 
 -0.30 
(0.24) 
UWT   0.24* 
(0.11) 
0.37* 
(0.14) 
  0.51* 
(0.23) 
0.73* 
(0.29) 
Major road 0.51 
(0.34) 
0.51 
(0.34) 
0.38 
(0.33) 
0.39 
(0.32) 
1.44* 
(0.70) 
1.41# 
(0.72) 
1.16# 
(0.69) 
1.18# 
(0.68) 
Owned -0.31 
(0.62) 
-0.31 
(0.63) 
-0.48 
(0.60) 
-0.46 
(0.59) 
-0.47 
(1.30) 
-0.52 
(1.32) 
-0.85 
(1.26) 
-0.81 
(1.25) 
Managed or 
franchised 
-2.22** 
(0.64) 
-2.22** 
(0.65) 
-2.28** 
(0.61) 
-2.37** 
(0.60) 
-3.71** 
(1.34) 
-3.69** 
(1.35) 
-3.83** 
(1.28) 
-3.98** 
(1.28) 
Hotel working 
year 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
Number of 
rooms 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.0006 
(0.002) 
0.0002 
(0.002) 
0.01# 
(0.005) 
0.01# 
(0.005) 
0.01 
(0.004) 
0.01 
(0.004) 
Male -0.75* 
(0.30) 
-0.75* 
(0.31) 
-0.66* 
(0.29) 
-0.66* 
(0.29) 
-0.97 
(0.63) 
-0.96 
(0.64) 
-0.79 
(0.61) 
-0.79 
(0.61) 
Large city 0.37 
(0.36) 
0.37 
(0.36) 
0.29 
(0.34) 
0.24 
(0.34) 
0.73 
(0.75) 
0.73 
(0.76) 
0.55 
(0.72) 
0.46 
(0.72) 
Up to Associate 
degree 
0.18 
(0.47) 
0.17 
(0.49) 
-0.15 
(0.48) 
-0.18 
(0.47) 
1.55 
(0.99) 
1.49 
(1.02) 
0.84 
(1.00) 
0.79 
(1.00) 
Bachelor and 
graduate degree 
-0.08 
(0.46) 
-0.08 
(0.49) 
-0.68 
(0.52) 
-0.71 
(0.51) 
0.97 
(0.96) 
0.86 
(1.03) 
-0.33 
(1.09) 
-0.38 
(1.08) 
Age -0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
Family 
members in 
hotel industry 
0.13 
(0.10) 
0.13 
(0.10) 
0.14 
(0.09) 
0.12 
(0.09) 
0.18 
(0.20) 
0.19 
(0.21) 
0.21 
(0.19) 
0.18 
(0.19) 
Use of social 
media 
-0.26 
(0.17) 
-0.26 
(0.17) 
-0.31# 
(0.16) 
-0.36* 
(0.16) 
-0.42 
(0.35) 
-0.41 
(0.36) 
-0.53 
(0.34) 
-0.60# 
(0.34) 
Model F 1.82 1.72 2.05 2.15 1.37 1.30 1.60 1.62 
P< 0.037 0.053 0.016 0.012 0.171 0.212 0.078 0.074 
R-square 0.579 0.579 0.621 0.645 0.509 0.510 0.562 0.579 
Model df 31 32 32 33 31 32 32 33 
Note a: Sample size is 73.  
         b: Significance levels: ** <0.01;   * <0.05;   # <0.10 
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Compared with SOEs, which can consistently obtain support from the government, and 
foreign firms, which enjoy preferential policies, private firms have faced many challenges in 
China. Private firms were not recognized as an essential component of the economy until 1997, 
and private assets and capital were not legalized by China’s constitution until 2004 (Ralston et 
al., 2006). During the field trip, many executives from private firms said that the costs of 
developing and maintaining strong ties were much higher for them than for managers of SOEs 
and foreign firms. This resulted in their use of less costly weak ties to improve firm performance.  
Taking Model 22-8 as an example, when using perceived performance as the dependent 
variable, the UWT was significant at a .05 level. This means that, when general managers of 
private firms used an additional unit of weak ties, the perceived performance compared with 
direct competitors would increase by a 0.73 unit. The regression coefficient of the control 
variable “managed or franchised” is significant, but with a negative sign, indicating that the 
perceived performance for managed or franchised private hotels was worse than that for 
independent private hotels. One counter-intuitive result is the negative sign of the control 
variable “the use of social media” as defined by the types of social media used by the general 
manager. This suggests that general managers of better performing private firms use fewer types 
of social media.     
Joint ventures 
The regression results for joint ventures show that UST is positively related to subjective 
performance measurements such as perceived service quality, perceived occupancy rate, and 
perceived performance. The results are consistent with the statement in Hypothesis 3b that strong 
ties are positively related to firm performance for joint ventures. However, the UWT is not 
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significant in any subgroup model for joint ventures; this does not support Hypothesis 4b, that 
weak ties are positively related to firm performance.   
Table 23 Effects of Managers’ Network Ties on Perceived Service Quality and  
Perceived Performance: Results for Joint Ventures 
 
 DV=Perceived Service Quality  DV=Perceived Performance  
 Model 1 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 3 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 4 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 5 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 6 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 7 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 8 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
UST  0.12* 
(0.06) 
 0.25** 
(0.09) 
 0.21 
(0.13) 
 0.41* 
(0.20) 
UWT   0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.17# 
(0.09) 
  0.05 
(0.13) 
-0.27 
(0.20) 
Major road -0.04 
(0.22) 
-0.07 
(0.22) 
-0.04 
(0.22) 
-0.11 
(0.22) 
0.33 
(0.47) 
0.28 
(0.47) 
0.33 
(0.48) 
0.21 
(0.47) 
Owned -0.30 
(0.65) 
-0.07 
(0.65) 
-0.30 
(0.66) 
0.18 
(0.66) 
-1.41 
(1.39) 
-1.02 
(1.40) 
-1.42 
(1.40) 
-0.63 
(1.42) 
Hotel working 
year 
0.04# 
(0.02) 
0.04# 
(0.02) 
0.04# 
(0.03) 
0.05* 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.09 
(0.05) 
Number of 
rooms 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.0002 
(0.005) 
Male -0.40# 
(0.22) 
-0.35 
(0.22) 
-0.40# 
(0.22) 
-0.30 
(0.22) 
-0.60 
(0.47) 
-0.50 
(0.47) 
-0.60 
(0.47) 
-0.43 
(0.47) 
Large city 0.18 
(0.22) 
0.19 
(0.22) 
0.18 
(0.22) 
0.17 
(0.22) 
-0.11 
(0.47) 
-0.09 
(0.47) 
-0.10 
(0.48) 
-0.13 
(0.47) 
Bachelor and 
graduate 
degree 
-0.13 
(0.19) 
-0.12 
(0.19) 
-0.13 
(0.19) 
-0.07 
(0.19) 
-0.33 
(0.41) 
-0.32 
(0.40) 
-0.34 
(0.41) 
-0.23 
(0.41) 
Age -0.06* 
(0.02) 
-0.07** 
(0.02) 
-0.06* 
(0.02) 
-0.07** 
(0.02) 
-0.09# 
(0.05) 
-0.10# 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.05) 
-0.11* 
(0.05) 
Family 
members in 
hotel industry 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.22 
(0.21) 
-0.22 
(0.21) 
-0.23 
(0.21) 
-0.18 
(0.21) 
Use of social 
media 
0.05 
(0.10) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
0.21 
(0.21) 
0.16 
(0.21) 
0.21 
(0.21) 
0.10 
(0.22) 
Model F 3.26 3.44 3.05 3.51 2.10 2.17 1.96 2.17 
P< 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.016 0.011 0.024 0.01 
R-square 0.392 0.422 0.393 0.444 0.293 0.316 0.294 0.331 
Model df 16 17 17 18 16 17 17 18 
Note a: Sample size is 98. 
         b: Significance levels: ** <0.01;   * <0.05;   # <0.10 
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As shown in Table 23, when using perceived performance as the dependent variable, only 
the UST is significant. The results suggest that, for joint ventures, strong ties are more important 
than weak ties. The correlation coefficient for the UST is 0.41, indicating that, if general 
managers of joint ventures used an additional unit of strong ties, the perceived performance of 
the hotel would increase by a 0.41 unit. 
The only control variable that is significant in Model 23-8 is age. This model indicates 
that the general manager’s age is negatively related to perceived performance for joint-venture 
hotels. Another variable has controlled for managers’ hotel industry experiences. The negative 
relationship between age and perceived performance can be explained by the fact that the 
economy hotel industry is a relatively new sector in the hotel industry, and working experience 
in independent hotels has not offered much help to general managers in their new positions. For 
example, many senior managers were not familiar with modern marketing strategies such as on-
line promotion and membership programs.   
A strategic behavioral perspective on joint ventures proposed that firms establish joint 
ventures to maximize rents (Harrigan, 1988). Under the conditions of strategic fit, cultural fit, 
capability fit, and organizational fit, joint ventures can blend partners’ competencies into a 
stronger organization than if each acts independently (Baughn, Neupert, Anh, & Hang, 2011; Cui, 
Ball, & Coyne, 2002). When forming joint ventures, foreign firms have been advised to make 
good use of local partners’ guanxi to overcome cultural differences (Rahman, 2008; Ralston et 
al., 2006). Managers of joint ventures can tap into the strong connections to both local partners’ 
domestic ties and foreign partners’ international ties. In other words, joint ventures can benefit 
from the resource bases of both parties (Su, Sirgy, & Littlefield, 2003).   
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Buck, Liu, and Ott (2010) have found that the degree of management control by mainland 
Chinese investors and foreign investors with a Chinese cultural orientation is positively 
associated with long-term strategies within Chinese international joint ventures. The long-term 
orientation is related to Confucian values that can affect government relationships and trust-
building. Many of the joint ventures that participated in this survey were founded by Chinese 
entrepreneurs who either obtained foreign investment or immigrated into a foreign country. 
These firms are not bothered as much by the culture distances as many Sino-Western joint 
ventures.   
Liu et al. (2010b) found that executives of economy hotel chains founded by Chinese 
people mainly using foreign funding (an ownership type very close to the joint venture) did not 
show any particular pattern when the effects of strong and weak ties were compared. The 
insignificance of weak ties for joint ventures is a phenomenon that deserves further investigation. 
One possible reason for this is that developing and maintaining strong ties is expensive and time-
consuming. The large proportion of time and energy spent on networking with strong ties may 
prevent managers of joint ventures from using weak ties to improve firm performance.  
SOEs  
The use of strong ties is not significant for SOEs in any of the models. These results do 
not support Hypothesis 3c, which proposes that managers’ strong ties are positively related to 
firm performance, or Hypothesis 3d, which proposes that managers’ strong ties are negatively 
related to firm performance for SOEs. In Chapter Two, both advantages and disadvantages of 
managers’ strong ties for SOEs were discussed. It is very likely that those effects offset each 
other.  
The only significant relationship was between RevPAR and the use of weak ties. The 
 84 
information in Table 24 suggests that, for SOEs, managers’ weak ties negatively affect firm 
performance, supporting Hypothesis 4c, which claims that managers’ uses of weak ties are 
negatively related to firm performance for SOEs. The negative effects of network ties is 
consistent with a study of newly partially privatized firms in China, which found that politically 
connected CEOs underperform non-connected CEOs (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007).   
Table 24 Effects of Managers’ Network Ties on RevPAR: Results for SOEs 
 
 DV=RevPAR  
 Model 1 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 3 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Model 4 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
UST  -8.86 
(9.96) 
 15.11 
(13.68) 
UWT   -22.69* 
(9.98) 
-35.05* 
(14.97) 
Major road 3.73 
(29.12) 
2.07 
(29.31) 
18.44 
(27.57) 
29.28 
(29.14) 
Owned -78.87 
(80.15) 
-76.47 
(80.56) 
-73.17 
(73.79) 
-74.15 
(73.43) 
Managed or franchised -113.91 
(79.68) 
-119.07 
(80.26) 
-113.74 
(73.32) 
-104.84 
(73.40) 
Hotel working year 0.38 
(1.82) 
0.35 
(1.82) 
0.03 
(1.68) 
-0.11 
(1.67) 
Number of rooms 0.30 
(0.21) 
0.25 
(0.22) 
0.21 
(0.20) 
0.25 
(0.20) 
Male 23.59 
(30.33) 
13.00 
(32.72) 
8.28 
(28.71) 
18.00 
(29.90) 
Large city -10.54 
(39.20) 
-13.35 
(39.51) 
-2.29 
(36.25) 
6.98 
(37.04) 
Up to associate degree -3.61 
(60.52) 
4.50 
(61.47) 
2.37 
(55.75) 
-8.21 
(56.29) 
Bachelor and graduate degree 12.62 
(58.71) 
22.02 
(59.92) 
28.58 
(54.48) 
21.24 
(54.61) 
Age 0.20 
(2.13) 
0.13 
(2.14) 
0.13 
(1.96) 
0.21 
(1.95) 
Family members in hotel industry 15.91 
(12.70) 
17.73 
(12.92) 
18.78 
(11.75) 
17.24 
(11.78) 
Use of social media -6.82 
(15.27) 
-6.58 
(15.35) 
-10.20 
(14.13) 
-12.44 
(14.21) 
Model F 1.68 1.62 2.14 2.12 
P< 0.115 0.133 0.042 0.046 
R-square 0.594 0.608 0.671 0.689 
Model df 20 21 21 22 
Note a: Sample size is 44.  
         b: Significance levels: ** <0.01;   * <0.05;   # <0.10 
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One possible explanation for the negative effects of weak ties here is that they are weak 
political ties. Government officials have power to assign resources, including financial capital, 
human capital, and physical capital, to SOEs. The relationships between SOE managers and 
officials are not balanced; there is more power located on the officials’ side. When certain 
connections are not valid any more, managers still cannot terminate those relationships and allot 
resources to more productive relationships. Managers need to spend time and money to maintain 
those political relationships but benefit very little from them. Otherwise, the officials could 
punish those firms who treated them differently before and after obtaining favors.  
The subgroup analysis results are summarized in Table 25. The results support the 
conclusion that the comparative importance of UST and UWT is contingent upon ownership: for 
joint ventures, UST is more important than UWT; for private firms, UWT is more important than 
UST; and for SOEs, only UWT is significant, but with a negative value, which makes the UWT 
less favorable than the UST for SOEs.  
Table 25 The Importance of Strong Ties Versus Weak Ties: The Fixed Effects Models 
 
 SOE Private Joint Ventures 
UST   Perceived occupancy +  (.10 level) 
Perceived service + 
Perceived performance + 
UWT Revpar1- Perceived Service + 
Perceived Profit + 
(Model .10 level) 
Perceived performance + 
(Model .10 level) 
 
 
Comparing the Ranks of Network Ties 
Additional information on the comparative importance of the four types of network ties 
was collected. Informants were asked to rank the four types of ties based on their importance in 
improving firm performance. Then, the two-dimensional table of (ownership types) * (rank of 
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SPT/SBT/WPT/WBT) was created and a chi-square test was conducted to compare the 
differences among managers of different ownership types. Because of the small number of 
exclusively foreign-owned firms, they were combined with joint ventures so that each cell of the 
cross table had more than five samples. No significant differences were found for SPT, SBT, and 
WBT. Only the rank of WPT showed some difference, supporting part of Hypothesis 6. The chi-
square test was significant at a 0.10 level. Table 26 indicates that a relatively larger proportion of 
private and foreign firms consider weak political ties as the most important network ties, while a 
smaller proportion of SOEs rank it as the most important.  
 
Table 26  Chi-square Test for the Rank of Weak Political Ties (WPT) 
 
                       Ownership 
 
 
 
Rank of                             Frequency 
WPT among                     Percent 
SPT, WPT, SBT,             Row Percent 
and WBT                          Col Percent 
SOE Private Foreign Total 
First  7 
3.23 
12.96 
16.67 
20 
9.22 
37.04 
28.17 
27 
12.44 
50.00 
25.96 
54 
24.88 
 
 
Second 10 
4.61 
14.93 
23.81 
30 
13.82 
44.78 
42.25 
27 
12.44 
40.30 
25.96 
67 
30.88 
 
 
Third 12 
5.53 
24.00 
28.57 
12 
5.53 
24.00 
16.90 
26 
11.98 
52.00 
25.00 
50 
23.04 
 
 
Fourth 13 
5.99 
28.26 
30.95 
9 
4.15 
19.57 
12.68 
24 
11.06 
52.17 
23.08 
46 
21.20 
 
 
Total 42 
19.35 
71 
32.72 
104 
47.93 
217 
100.00 
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The hypotheses and results were summarized in Table 27.  
Table 27 A Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
 
Hypothesis Results 
Hypothesis 1a: Managers of foreign firms have fewer strong ties than 
those of state-owned and private firms.   
Hypothesis 1b: Managers of state-owned firms have more strong ties 
than those of private firms.  
Partially supported 
 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 2a: Managers’ strong ties are positively related to firm 
performance in China.    
Hypothesis 2b: Managers’ weak ties are positively related to firm 
performance in China.    
Supported  
 
Supported 
Hypothesis 3a: Managers’ strong ties are positively related to firm 
performance for private firms.   
Hypothesis 3b: Managers’ strong ties are positively related to firm 
performance for joint ventures.  
Hypothesis 3c: Managers’ strong ties are positively related to firm 
performance for state-owned firms. 
Hypothesis 3d: Managers’ strong ties are negatively related to firm 
performance for state-owned firms. 
Not supported. 
 
Supported  
 
Not supported 
 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 4a: Managers’ weak ties are positively related to firm 
performance for private firms. 
Hypothesis 4b: Managers’ weak ties are positively related to firm 
performance for joint ventures. 
Hypothesis 4c: Managers’ weak ties are negatively related to firm 
performance for state-owned firms.  
Supported 
 
Not supported.  
 
Supported 
Hypothesis 5a:  The positive relationship between managers’ strong ties 
and firm performance is greater than that between managers’ weak ties 
and firm performance for private firms. 
Hypothesis 5b:  The positive relationship between managers’ strong 
ties and firm performance is greater than that between managers’ weak 
ties and firm performance for joint ventures. 
Not supported 
 
 
Supported 
Hypothesis 6: The ranking of managers’ network ties will be 
significantly different for firms of different ownership types. 
Partially supported 
 
  
 88 
Major Functions of Managers’ Network Ties 
Among the four popularly mentioned functions of network ties, obtaining licenses and 
certificates or passing routine inspections was the one most frequently mentioned by the 
informants.  On average, 38% of managers’ network ties were helpful in this function. Since 
these are areas governed by political ties, the results reflect the importance of political ties in the 
transitional economy of China. Managers’ network ties are also widely used to obtain business 
and acquire intangible assets such as human capital and knowledge. Nevertheless, an essential 
function of network ties discussed by many previous studies (e.g., Zhang, Souitaris, Soh, & 
Wong, 2008; Zhang & Wong, 2008), acquiring financial and physical capital, was not popular 
here. Less than 10% of network ties were claimed to make a difference in this function. The 
details are shown in Table 28. Other data on frequency (not shown) suggest that, among the 189 
informants who reported the percentage of network ties that function in acquiring funding and 
physical assets, 97 considered no network ties to have ever helped them to acquire financial and 
physical capital.  This could be due to the fact that obtaining financial capital was dealt with by 
chain-level executives, not property-level managers.   
Table 28 The Percentage of Total Network Ties Helpful in Different Functions 
 
Variable N Mean Std 
Dev 
Minimum Maximum 
Acquiring financial and physical capital 
Acquiring human capital and knowledge 
Obtaining more business 
Obtaining licenses and certificates or   
              passing routine inspections 
189 
200 
213 
212 
9.05 
23.46 
27.67 
37.62 
16.75 
21.23 
25.42 
31.11 
0 
0 
0 
0 
90.00 
90.00 
100.00 
100.00 
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The next chapter will conclude the study with an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
research. Limitations of the study and topics for future research will also be discussed there.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter begins with an evaluation of the effectiveness of the research. Measures 
employed to ensure the validity of the study are restated. Key findings from the research are 
summarized and discussed in the next section. A description of the contributions and limitations 
of the study follows. Then, a few topics for future studies are suggested.   
The Effectiveness of the Study 
The original research idea evolved over many years. During the process of finalizing the 
research proposal, the author read dozens of books, reports, research papers, and other articles to 
learn about the field. To understand the concepts and methods better, he participated in a week-
long workshop on social network analysis organized by distinguished scholars in the field. The 
research questions were, in consequence, addressed from multiple theoretical perspectives such 
as social network theory, institution theory, and agency theory.  
The author strictly followed scientific guidelines in preparing and executing the survey 
research, and many measures were taken to ensure the validity of the study. The major measure 
was to triangulate the results through a combination of data collection methods. The archival 
method was used to build background information on the economy hotel industry in China and 
the key players of the field.  A preliminary field visit combined participant observation and 
interviews to develop the survey instruments and form a research framework. The survey 
research followed strict rules in sampling, data collection, and analysis. Interesting stories and 
live cases collected during the meetings with executives of economy hotel chains were used to 
explain the quantitative survey research.  
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For the survey, multiple measures of independent and dependent variables were collected 
and the convergence of the results showed consistency in the research findings. More than one 
analytical method was used so as to triangulate the results. For example, both ordinary least 
squares regression and ordinal logistic regression were used to analyze the effects of managers’ 
network ties on perceived firm performance measurements. Both parametric methods such as 
MANOVA and non-parametric methods such as Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to compare the 
numbers of strong and weak ties among different groups.  
Summary and Discussion of the Findings 
Comparison of numbers of ties among firms of different ownership types 
Chapter One listed six research questions of this study. The first one was: do managers of 
firms of different ownership types use different numbers of network ties? The study did find that 
managers of SOEs and foreign firms used different numbers of network ties.  
On average, managers of SOEs had more strong ties and weak political ties than those of 
foreign firms. Because of their historical connections with officials in the government and trade 
associations, managers in SOEs were able to create and maintain more strong political ties than 
those of foreign firms. Historically, the bureaucratic system ensured free movement of human 
capital between government organizations and SOEs (Walder, 2011). The preliminary field visit 
found that this tradition was continuing. Many of the top executives of SOEs had previously 
been government officials. For example, the CEO of a mid-scale hotel group in Beijing was the 
director of the industrial management department of the China National Tourism Administration, 
and the president of a tourism group in a southern city was previously the deputy mayor of that 
city. 
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The reason for the differences in strong business ties could be that many state-owned 
economy hotels belong to a large state-owned tourism group due to the reform policy initiated by 
the government to agglomerate the state-owned hotel assets and put them under one umbrella. 
For example, the parent company for the state-owned economy chain Shidom is Beijing Tourism 
Group, with 40,367 employees and total assets of 28.55 billion RMB by the end of 2008, and the 
parent company for Garden Inn is Lingnan Group, whose core businesses include hotels, tourism, 
and food processing. Both parent companies are giant tourism groups formed by combining 
multiple tourism-related firms directed by local government. The many business conferences and 
social opportunities created by the groups helped property-level managers to have lots of strong 
business ties.  
The lack of difference between managers of SOEs and private firms could be explained 
by the transfer of human resources between SOEs and private firms. This study collected data on 
the numbers of government bureaus, trade associations, and SOEs a manager had worked at 
before taking the current general manager position. As shown in Table 29, among the 78 private 
managers who answered this question, nearly half of them had worked in government, a trade 
association, or an SOE previously.  During the 2009 field trip, the author met with the vice 
president of a private economy hotel chain in Beijing who had previously worked in an SOE. He 
said that many of his prior connections built during his career in the SOE were still active and 
helpful to his current private hotel chain.  
  
 93 
Table 29 Number of Government Offices, Trade Associations, and SOEs 
Where Private Managers Previously Worked  
 
Number of organizations 
worked at previously  
Frequency Percent 
0 36 46.2 
1 22 28.2 
2 9 11.5 
3 3 3.9 
4 3 3.9 
5 2 2.6 
8 2 2.6 
13 1 1.2 
 
Another way to address this phenomenon is by examining the length of the hotel industry 
work experience of private managers, which is shown in Table 30. Managers in private economy 
hotel chains had an average of 10.5 years of hotel work experience, but the age of these private 
economy hotel chains was between one and eight years. Many of the managers had to work 
elsewhere in the hotel industry previously. As SOEs played important roles in the development 
of China’s hotel industry (e.g., a large proportion of star-rated hotels are SOEs), it is very likely 
that the previous work experience of these private economy hotel managers was gained in an 
SOE. During the preliminary field visit in 2009, the author found many examples of private 
economy hotel chains hiring managers from SOEs. For example, a general manager of a private 
economy hotel in Shanghai had been working in China’s first state-owned economy hotel chain, 
the JJ-Inn.     
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Table 30 The Hotel Industry Work Experience of Managers in Private Firms 
 
Variable N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Hotel working 
years 
77 10.46 1.00 30.00 
 
The effectiveness of managerial ties 
The whole data set analysis tried to address the second and third research questions 
proposed in the introduction section. The second research question asked whether the 
effectiveness of network ties depended on the institutional environment of the firm. The study 
showed mixed results for the effectiveness of managerial ties. The results were also consistent 
with a previous study that showed the selection of output variables could be a contingent factor 
for the strong tie versus weak tie argument (Bruderl & Priesendorf, 1998).The regression results 
using perceived service quality and perceived performance as dependent variables indicated that 
both UST and UWT were positively related to firm performance. The fact that managers’ 
network ties can help firms to improve service quality is not a surprise. For example, many 
products offered by hotels such as internet access, phone connections, and cable TV depend on 
good routine maintenance by suppliers. Good relationships with suppliers can ensure timely 
delivery of such services. Connections with government officials in charge of hotel inspections 
can give hotels useful suggestions on how to pass the routine inspections and maintain normal 
operation.   
When using the subjective measurement of perceived occupancy rate and the objective 
measurement of RevPAR, only strong ties (strong political ties for RevPAR) were significant. 
The increase of RevPAR could be due to the fact that both strong ties and weak ties can bring 
more business to the hotels.  One executive in Zhejiang province described how good 
relationships with government officials were able to bring conference and banquet business to 
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the hotel. He also listed a few major government bureaus with large purchasing power: the 
Committee for Development Planning, the Industrial and Commercial Bureau, the Finance 
Bureau, and the Tax Bureau. One typical sales strategy for many economy hotel chains is to visit 
all companies and organizations located within a certain distance from the hotel, offer discount 
rates to these business partners, and thus get more business from them.   
The results on perceived profit suggested that, under certain conditions, only weak ties, 
not strong ties, positively affect firm performance. The reason only weak ties improved profit 
could be explained by the fact that the comparative costs of maintaining strong ties were higher. 
Even if both strong ties and weak ties could improve occupancy rate, the high costs related to 
maintaining strong ties might offset the benefits from strong ties. Another reason could be that 
many actors linked by strong ties could bring more business to the hotel, but they often asked for 
a high discount rate as a prerequisite to keeping the long-term business relationship. This might 
lower the profit margin of the hotel.  
Based on the aforementioned results, it is hard to answer the third research question, 
whether strong ties are more important than weak ties in improving firm performance. A 
conclusion cannot be drawn when comparing the culture-based and institutional-based network 
views. However, most of the chain-level executives the author met during the field trip were 
inclined to the culture-based view and said that managerial ties would continuous to play 
important roles in China, though the extent to which firms could benefit from managerial ties 
might change with a more established institutional environment.    
Using the fixed effects model, the results are very different from the OLS regressions. 
Only the UST is positively related to the perceived service quality of the firm, showing that 
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strong ties are more important than weak ties. However, the effects of network ties on all other 
performance measurements are insignificant.  
Ownership type as a contingent factor 
The subgroup analysis provided answers to the fourth research question, how does the 
comparative importance of managers’ strong ties and weak ties differ among SOEs, private firms, 
and joint ventures? The analysis suggested that ownership type was a contingent factor for the 
strong tie and weak tie paradox. For private firms, only UWT was positively related to firm 
performance. During my preliminary field trip, the manager of a private firm told a story about 
how weak ties had helped his firm. A male adult registered guest stayed in a 7th floor room of his 
hotel. The guest had just had a fight with his wife at home. His wife rushed into his hotel room 
and locked the door. After a fierce quarrel with her, the male guest kicked the room window 
open and jumped out. He landed on the top of a car and died. Confronted with charges such as 
unsafe facilities and ignoring visitor registration policies (his wife was not registered when she 
rushed into the hotel room), the hotel was potentially liable and faced the possibility of high fines 
or a penalty of suspension. In addition, the damaged car’s owner brought TV reporters and 
threatened to broadcast news that could negatively affect the hotel. Helped by an acquaintance 
from the government, the hotel was able to settle the issue at very low cost and avoided damages 
to its brand.         
From previous discussion, we know that both strong ties and weak ties can bring benefits 
to the firms, but why is the use of strong ties not significant for private firms? One possible 
reason is that, although private firms can benefit from managers’ network ties, they need to 
spend more resources to cultivate and maintain their strong ties due to their relatively weak 
status in the economy’s structure. Ahlstrom, Bruton, and Yeh (2008) suggested that private firms 
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had to cultivate relationships with government officials when operating under ineffective formal 
institutions. Tsang (1998) suggested that the status of the partners affected the value of guanxi. 
During the author’s field visit, some executives of private firms stated their concern that they 
were forced into some of the relationships. “Red envelopes” (cash gifts) were needed to obtain 
certain licenses or pass the annual inspection (Liu et al., 2011). One private owner of an 
economy hotel chain got so tired of the frequent requests from political connections that he tried 
to sue the officials who forced him to bring gifts. Although he won the lawsuit, the high costs 
related to the more strict inspections that followed put him in a much worse position. Chen (1995) 
suggested that many firms consider network ties a burden and try to avoid some connections 
(Fan, 2002a).   
For joint ventures, only UST was positively related to firm performance, indicating that 
strong ties were more important than weak ties. In one story collected during my field trip, an 
executive of a joint venture economy hotel chain used a variety of strong ties to improve firm 
performance. Before the opening of one hotel, a local government official who was his friend 
gave him a very useful suggestion on how to deal with government inspections. By taking that 
suggestion, the hotel manager fixed a serious defect of the hotel and saved a huge amount of 
money on interior decoration. This hotel manager was also informed, while having dinner with 
his friend from the tourism bureau, of a government policy that would assign incentives to firms 
using international brands. He applied for the incentive and successfully obtained 100,000 RMB 
for one of his hotels and 30,000 RMB for another. This strong tie with the government official 
had been created years earlier when he was a general manager of a state-owned economy hotel. 
The major reason for the effectiveness of the strong ties of managers of joint ventures 
may be that joint ventures can benefit from strong network connections of both domestic and 
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foreign partners. Another possible reason for the effectiveness of joint venture managers’ strong 
ties is that joint ventures cherry-pick the best general managers with strong connections at SOEs 
and private firms. Many joint ventures offer higher salaries and benefits to their managers and 
employees. Those managers who have strong business and political connections will use these 
resources to bargain for better jobs, and some will change their jobs and work for joint ventures. 
One chain-level executive of an SOE expressed worry that his chain was unable to attract high 
quality human capital from firms of other ownership types and was threatened with losing high-
level managers to other firms. 
For SOEs, the use of weak ties was negatively related to firm performance. This was 
consistent with the hypothesis derived from agency theory and addressed the fifth research 
question as to whether managerial ties always positively affect firm performance. Previous 
studies have found that network ties have not always brought positive impacts (Braendle, Gasser, 
& Noll, 2005; Fan, 2002b; Siegel, 2007), but it is the strong ties that negatively affect firm 
performance. The reason is the inertia or stickiness of strong ties. Doing business with friends 
can take away room for maneuvering (Batjargal, 2003). In a transitional economy such as China, 
with its very dynamic environment, managers need to keep terminating unused ties and allot 
resources to building new ties. In general, when weak ties become invalid, managers can easily 
break these ties without any additional cost. However, this is not true when managing strong ties.  
One major reason for the negative impacts of political ties is that, sometimes, hotels have 
to keep unqualified employees introduced by government officials. Network ties play an 
essential role in acquiring human capital (Liu, et al., 2010a), but unqualified employees referred 
by government officials may negatively affect firm performance. One example in the literature of 
how weak political ties negatively affected a firm because of human capital referral can 
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summarize this problem (Liu et al., 2011). A hotel manager in Shanghai hired a lady referred by 
her relative who was a local government official. One day, the new employee had an argument 
with her colleague and slapped that person in the face.  Following company policy that any 
fighting would result in dismissal from the job, the manager fired her. This event destroyed the 
relationship between the manager and the official. Afterwards, the official created a lot of trouble 
for the hotel.  
This study suggested that the use of weak ties was negatively related to firm performance 
for managers of SOEs. In Chapter Four, the author suggested that the negative effects of weak 
ties could be more specifically caused by weak political ties. In the relationships between 
government officials and hotel managers, less power is located on the managers’ side. SOE 
managers cannot terminate useless political ties even when the connections are weak. One 
executive from an SOE said that you could not treat a retired official to cold tea (a traditional 
Chinese saying that refers to bad treatment of a person who has helped one when one does not 
need his/her help any more). Fan (2002b) suggested that the business-to-government guanxi is 
not reliable and that the costs of cultivating those relationships may outweigh the potential 
benefits.  
Many weak business ties are between economy hotels and their parent companies or 
among firms belonging to the same group. Transactions are then dominated by political tasks, 
not financial performance (Sheng, Zhou, & Li, 2011). One CEO of a state-owned economy hotel 
chain suggested that, when hosting guests such as those from the government, hotels did not 
benefit very much financially. Sometimes they needed to make extra efforts to satisfy the 
customers from the government with high quality services at deeply discounted prices. 
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Contributions of the Study 
Contributions to theory 
This study provided new insights for resolving the paradox of social network theory 
regarding the relative importance of strong ties and weak ties. It proved that strong ties and weak 
ties were distinct phenomena showing different characteristics, and ownership type was a new 
contingent factor that reconciled the comparative effects of strong ties versus weak ties. The 
effects of managers’ strong ties and weak ties on firm performance differ among firms of 
different ownership types. Managers’ strong ties are more important than weak ties for joint 
ventures, but weak ties are more important than strong ties for private firms. These results are 
consistent with those derived from the social network theory and social exchange theory. 
Managers’ weak ties have negative effects on firm performance for SOEs, supporting the agency 
theory.  
The study provided mixed results as regards the culture-based and institution-based 
network views. Gold, Guthrie, and Wank (2002) compared the two literature groups on guanxi 
(network). One perspective takes guanxi as an important component of Chinese culture 
originating in Confucianism philosophy and considers “that understanding and successfully 
managing interpersonal relationships are essential elements of being authentically ‘Chinese,’ 
regardless of time or place” (Gold et al., 2002, p.10). For example, King (1985) described guanxi 
as essential stock knowledge for Chinese adults to use in managing their everyday life. If the 
culture-based network view is correct, managers’ network ties will always be effective as long as 
they are in a Chinese setting. 
The other perspective sees guanxi as a response to certain institutional and historical 
conditions in China and a mechanism for dealing with the incompleteness of the system of  law 
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and regulation (Zheng, 1986). Wank (1999) found that private businessmen used guanxi to steer 
through institutionally uncertain environments and needed assistance from government officials 
to obtain license, resources, and other favors. However, in this view, the importance of guanxi 
will gradually decline with development of a more formalized institutionally system (Fan, 
2002b).   
The information for this study was about economy hotels in 2009, 30 years after China’s 
reform and open door policy, leading to a more and more established institutional system. The 
effectiveness of both strong ties and weak ties when perceived service quality and perceived 
performance are dependent variables tends to support the culture-based network view that the 
impacts of social networks have not diminished in today’s economy. However, neither strong 
ties nor weak ties are effective when using occupancy rate to measure firm performance, and this 
supports the institutional-based network view that managers’ network ties are ineffective with a 
more established institutional system. The results using perceived profit as a performance 
measurement support Peng and Zhou’s (2005) intermediate phase assumption, where only weak 
ties are effective.  
Discussions with top executives of economy hotels chains showed that not all effects of 
network ties could be captured by this study with the current research design. For example, 
managers’ strong political ties can help hotels to get licenses more quickly. This positive effect 
happens before the opening of a hotel and cannot be measured by occupancy rate, RevPAR or 
perceived service quality. Another example is that some economy hotel chains acquire properties 
with lower prices with the support of managerial ties; again, this is a positive effect not captured 
in the results of this study. The data collection process of this study is itself an example of the 
importance of network ties. Without referrals, the author would have had no chance to collect 
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information from general managers, even if he had visited their properties in person. When 
referred by friends from the government or trade associations, the author not only obtained 
opportunities to meet with top executives of economy hotels/hotel chains, but also was treated 
occasionally to fancy dinners. 
Contributions to practice 
Since network ties still play important roles in today’s China, managers are encouraged to 
use a networking strategy to obtain licenses and certificates, acquire businesses, human capital, 
and knowledge, and to obtain financial capital and physical assets. However, firms of different 
ownership types should use different networking strategies. For example, the effects of strong 
ties may be stronger for joint ventures and less effective for private firms. For joint ventures, 
managers can develop and maintain strong ties to claim benefits from network ties. If the costs of 
developing and maintaining strong ties are similar to those for weak ties, managers are 
encouraged to direct time and resources to strong ties, because the extent to which firms can 
benefit from managerial ties is higher for strong ties than for weak ties. However, private firms 
should direct their resources to developing weak ties, because weak ties are more effective for 
them than strong ties. SOEs need to set up better governance systems so that managers will 
weigh the benefits and costs of networking based not on their own personal interests, but on the 
firms’ benefits.   
Limitations of the Study 
The research confined itself to entrepreneurial economy hotels in the transitional 
economy of China. The results may not be informative for firms in developed countries because 
they face different institutional environments and ownership type may not be an important factor 
in many developed Western countries. It has been well recognized that entrepreneurship differs 
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in developed economies and transition economies (Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010). Moreover, 
some of the findings may not apply to firms which are not in their entrepreneurial periods.  
Since this is a study done on a single industry, additional caution is needed when 
extending the conclusion to other industries. The hotel industry was assigned to the “special 
industries” category in China. The effects of network ties in the hotel industry may differ from 
those in other industries in such a way as to strengthen the effects of political ties for the hotel 
industry. This should be understood in light of the complicated processes of opening a hotel in 
China as described by Liu et al. (2011, p.8):   
The procedure of opening a hotel, for example, is not as simple as many might 
think. Disregarding many steps, such as buying/leasing land or building a hotel, 
even with an established hotel ready to serve, operators still have to obtain 
licenses or permits from multiple government bureaus. Typically, before the 
opening of a hotel, an operator needs to obtain permission to use the company 
name from the Industrial and Commercial Bureau. Then, the operator needs to get 
a sanitation license from the Health Bureau (for a hotel with food and beverage 
services), a license for special industry from the Police Department, a pollution 
discharge license from the Environmental Protection Bureau, and a fire safety 
prevention certificate from the Fire Control Department.  After registering and 
obtaining a business license at the Industrial and Commercial Bureau, the operator 
needs to apply for a tax code certificate and complete tax registration at the Tax 
Bureau. Foreign firms need to go through another layer of government: the 
Municipal Bureau of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. In addition, to 
join the hotel star-rating system, an operator needs approval from the local 
tourism bureau for 1-4 star properties and the national tourism bureau for 5-star 
hotels.  
Though the researcher sought to follow scientific research disciplines, the study exhibits 
some weaknesses due to a variety of constraints. For example, it did not get any responses from 
foreign managers. Although the proportion of foreign managers is very small due to the high cost 
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of their labor, the author is aware, based on information collected during the preliminary field 
visit, that some economy hotel managers are foreigners. In addition, there were too few 
exclusively foreign-owned hotels. This disabled the subgroup tests with this group.  
Some problems could have been solved by a better research design.  For example, the 
survey instrument collected data on total revenue of the hotel instead of room revenue; this may 
inflate RevPAR for some economy hotels.  During the preliminary field visit in 2009, the author 
found that most economy hotels either do not offer food and beverage (F&B) services or only 
offer breakfast, which just contributes a very small proportion to the total revenue. However, 
when very high RevPar numbers for some hotels were detected, the author realized that there 
were a few economy hotels that offered services such as F & B and recreation. Although 
remedial measures were taken, such as calling some managers to collect data on room revenue, 
some of the data on this variable are still inflated.  
How to define and measure strong ties and weak ties in survey research is a challenge. 
This study used ties with friends and ties with acquaintances to define those two concepts. 
However, the distinctions between the group of friends and the group of acquaintances are 
somewhat ambiguous. Informants may use different standards to define their own friends and 
acquaintances. A few executives expressed their worries during the field visit and indicated that 
sometimes they could not clearly put some people into a certain category. The question becomes 
more complicated when considering the dynamic characteristic of the definition. Some managers 
continuously make efforts to turn acquaintances valuable to their business into friends. Some 
friends who have helped the informants before may become acquaintances gradually if no 
routine communication is maintained.      
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If more resources had been available, the data collection process could have been 
improved. Sheng et al. (2011) have suggested that using on-site interviews instead of mail 
surveys can generate more valid information because it ensures collection of information from 
the proper respondents and the interviewers can explain concepts and questions that may create 
confusion for the informants. However, the small amount of research funding available could not 
cover the costs for on-site interviews. Due to time limitations, the author did not get a chance to 
send the final results to the informants and collect their feedback. More informative explanations 
and rationales could have been provided with this additional step.   
Unanswered Questions and Future Topics  
Some interesting results were found that were not same as those of previous studies and 
were not predicted by current theories. For example, negative effects of network ties were 
reported by a few studies, but most of them concerned strong ties. Because it is relatively hard to 
terminate unwanted strong connections with certain groups, the inertia leads to stickiness of the 
structure and hinder managers from formulating desired new ties. The current study found that 
some weak ties were also negatively related to firm performance for SOEs. Additional studies on 
this phenomenon could lead to productive findings.  
The two instrument variables proposed at the beginning of this study do not correlate 
highly with the independent variables, so they did not pass the relevance test. Better instrument 
variables are needed to correct the error caused by the reverse causal relationship and answer 
research question six, whether there are any causal relationships between managers’ network ties 
and firm performance. The author has one potential instrument variable in mind, the loss of a cell 
phone. The loss of a cell phone means losing contact with many weak ties, and it is a totally 
random event that would not correlate with other variables in the model.  
 106 
Another question has to do with the blurring of boundaries among firms of different 
ownership types. With the growth of publicly listed companies whose shares were owned by a 
variety of owners with diverse background, it became harder and harder to put a firm in one of 
the four ownership types. In addition, there are cases where entrepreneurs strategically blur the 
ownership boundaries to deal with environmental uncertainty and resource scarcity (Tan, 2002). 
For example, Estrin & Prevezer (2011) found cases where entrepreneurs registered a private 
enterprise as state-owned to disguise the private ownership before private firms were protected 
by the institutions. Fake foreign firms were once a popular phenomenon in China when the 
government offered tax and other benefits to foreign firms. Some private firms and SOEs 
transferred their money overseas and invested it back into China under the name of a foreign 
company. The situation has been complicated by the existence of many Chinese who founded 
and developed private firms in China and then obtained citizenship in another country and 
returned to China. Walder (2011) has proposed a new typology suggesting four different sectors 
just for domestic firms: the state-owned sector, the privatized state sector, the transactional sector, 
and the entrepreneurial sector. Tihanyi, Griffith, and Russell (2005) have suggested that cultural 
distance could affect corporations’ strategies and performance. Even for exclusively foreign- 
owned firms, the effects of network ties may differ because of the different cultural distances 
between their home countries and China. How to establish a clearly defined ownership typology 
and research with a refined ownership typology would make good topics for future research and 
could bring new findings to this field.   
This paper mainly addresses research questions through social network theory, 
institutional theory, and agency theory. Other studies have addressed similar questions through 
other theories, such as the resources-based view and transaction cost theory (Krug & 
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Hendrischke, 2008; Tsang, 1998; Wu, Wu, & Rui, 2010). The final suggestion here is to study 
the effects of managers’ network ties through new theoretical perspectives.   
 
During the preliminary field visit, many top executives of economy hotel chains quoted a 
popular saying to emphasize the importance of network ties, “network ties can improve 
productivity.” Network ties will remain an important factor in improving firm performance, at 
least under the conditions of a less established institutional environment. This study proved that 
the comparative effects of managers’ strong ties versus weak ties differ among firms of different 
ownership types and suggested that managers use networking strategies that are most effective 
for their firms.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
Survey Instrument for Web-based Survey: English Version 
Dissertation English
You are being asked to take part in my dissertation study, which explores the effects of managers’ network ties on 
hotel performance. Please read this form carefully and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to take part 
in the study.  
 
What the study is about: The purpose of this study is to learn whether the effects of managers’ network ties on hotel 
performance differ among economy hotels of different ownership types in China. You need to have worked as a 
general manager for the current hotel since before January 1, 2009, to take part in this study.  
 
What you will be asked to do: If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to fill out a survey 
questionnaire. The survey will include questions about your background information, your hotel’s performance, and 
your networking patterns. The survey will take 20 to 25 minutes to complete.  
 
Risks and benefits: I do not anticipate any risks to you participating in this study other than those encountered in 
day-to-day life. 
 
I will offer you a report on the results of this research which may provide useful information on how economy hotel 
managers use network ties in general and the most effective network mixes for managers in state-owned, private, and 
foreign economy hotels.  
 
Compensation: Each participant will either receive a Cornell University souvenir for sure or be entered in a lottery to 
win ¥1,000 in Cash (one winner for every 30 participants).  
 
Your answers will be confidential. The records of this study will be kept private. In any sort of report I make public I 
will not include any information that will make it possible to identify you or your hotel. Research records will be kept 
in a locked file; only the researcher will have access to the records.  
 
Taking part is voluntary: Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. Although answering all the questions on the 
questionnaire will be very helpful to my study, you still may skip any question that you do not want to answer. If you 
decide to take part, you are free to withdraw at any time.  
 
If you have questions: The researcher conducting this study is Zhaoping Liu. Please ask any questions you have 
now. If you have questions later, you may contact Zhaoping Liu at ZL49@cornell.edu or at 001-607-2554921. 
Domestic phone number: 15810248468. If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a subject in 
this study, you may contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 1-607-255-5138 or access their website at 
http://www.irb.cornell.edu. You may also report your concerns or complaints anonymously through Ethicspoint or by 
calling toll free (in the U.S.) at 1-866-293-3077. Ethicspoint is an independent organization that serves as a liaison 
between the University and the person bringing the complaint so that anonymity can be ensured.  
 
You can print a copy of this form to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received answers to any questions I asked. I 
consent to take part in the study.  
 
Printed name of the researcher: Zhaoping Liu  
 
If you decide to participate, please click “next” after signing your name. 
1. Signature 
 
1. Consent form
*
Name
Date
 
2. Background of the Economy Hotel and the General Manager
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Dissertation English
2. What is the ownership type of the hotel? 
3. Is this hotel affiliated with a hotel chain? 
1. In China, how many hotels were affiliated with this hotel chain by the end of 2009? 
(If you don't have an exact number, your best estimate is fine) 
2. Please select the operational model of this hotel (check one) 
1. Which category best describes the location of the hotel? (check one) 
2. Which category best describes the location of the hotel? (check one) 
1. When was the hotel opened? 
Year (####)
Month (1-12)
 
3. Background of the Economy Hotel and the General Manager (2)
Number of hotels
 
4. Background of the Economy Hotel and the General Manager (3)
Stated-owned
 
nmlkj
Private
 
nmlkj
Exclusively foreign-owned
 
nmlkj
Joint-venture
 
nmlkj
Other (please specify) 
Yes
 
nmlkj
No
 
nmlkj
Owned/leased (owned/leased and operated by the hotel chain) nmlkj
Managed (owned/leased by another party, but managed by a team from the hotel chain and using the hotel chain brand) nmlkj
Franchised and managed by owner (operated independently by the owner himself/herself but using the hotel chain brand) nmlkj
Franchised and managed by someone other than the owner (operated independently by an owner-hired professional mamager 
but using the hotel chain brand) 
nmlkj
Urban
 
nmlkj
Suburban
 
nmlkj
Major traffic route (one-way two-lane road, two-way four-lane road, or road with more lanes) nmlkj
Side road (fewer than two lanes going one way) nmlkj
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3. What is your educational attainment? 
1. How many close family members (parents, spouse, siblings, and/or children) were 
in the hotel industry before you started to work in your current general manager 
position?  
2. In how many government organizations, non-government organizations, and/or 
state-owned enterprises had you served before you started your current job?  
3. Please pick 1-3 of your most frequently used social network sites/tools and report 
the number of friends/acquaintances on each site/tool.  
 
5. Background of the Economy Hotel and the General Manager (4)
1. How long have you been working in any industry 
(number of years and/or months)?  
 
2. How long have you been working in the hotel industry ? 
(Number of years and/or months)  
 
 
6. Background of the Economy Hotel and the General Manager (5)
Number of family memebers
Number of government organizations
Number of non-government 
organizations
Number of state-owned enterprises
MSN messenger
Skype
QQ
Facebook
Linkedin
Xiaonei/Renren
Twitter
Blog
Kaixin
Lower than a high school diploma
 
nmlkj
High school diploma
 
nmlkj
Some college or an associate degree
 
nmlkj
Bachelor’s degree
 
nmlkj
Graduate degree and above
 
nmlkj
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4. Please report the amount of time (number of minutes) spent on each site/tool you 
picked in the previous question on a typical day.  
1. How many rooms did the hotel have by the end of 2009?  
2. What was the total revenue of the hotel in 2009? RMB  
3. How many rooms did the hotel sell in 2009? 
4. What was the net profit of the hotel in 2009? RMB  
5. What were the hotel’s start-of-year assets in 2009? RMB  
1. Rate your hotel's record in 2009 compared to your direct competitors.  
How do friends differ from acquaintances? 
 
Acquaintances are people you know and with whom you only have reciprocal relationships. In general, you enter into 
the relationship non-voluntarily (e.g., with colleagues or neighbors), the emotional intensity between you is low, and 
MSN messenger
Skype
QQ
Facebook
Linkedin
Xiaonei/Renren
Twitter
Blog
Kaixin
 
7. Hotel Performance Measures
Rooms
Total revenue (¥)
Number of rooms sold in 
2009
Net profit (¥)
Assets (¥)
 
8. Hotel Performance Measures (2)
 the lowest much lower lower comparable higher much higher the highest
Service quality nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Guest satisfaction ratings nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Occupancy rate (your best 
estimate is fine) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Average room rate (your 
best estimate is fine) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
Gross profit (your best 
estimate is fine) nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
9. General Managers' Network Patterns
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your relationships with them are oriented by gain-and-loss calculations.  
 
Friends are those people you freely choose from among acquaintances and with whom you have both reciprocal and 
altruistic relationships. The emotional intensity between you is higher than that with acquaintances. The relationships 
between you and your friends are emotion-oriented and you trust friends more than acquaintances. 
 
 
Please check the box best describing the extent to which you have utilized personal network ties to enhance the 
success of your business during the year 2009. 
1. Officials in the government, industrial bureaus, regulatory and supporting 
organizations (such as tax bureaus, state banks, and commercial administration 
bureaus), and trade associations who are your friends 
2. Managers at buyer firms, supplier firms, and competitor firms who are your friends  
3. Officials in the government, industrial bureaus, regulatory and supporting 
organizations (such as tax bureaus, state banks, and commercial administration 
bureaus), and trade associations who are your acquaintances  
4. Managers at buyer firms, supplier firms, and competitor firms who are your 
acquaintances  
1. How many network ties helped you in improving firm performance in 2009? (Enter 
a number) 
 
utilized very 
little
utilized very 
extensively
Officials who are your 
friends
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
utilized very 
little
utilized very 
extensively
Managers who are your 
friends
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
utilized very 
little
utilized very 
extensively
Officials who are your 
acquaintances
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
utilized very 
little
utilized very 
extensively
Managers who are your 
acquaintances
nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
10. General Managers' Network Patterns (2)
Officials in the government, industrial bureaus, regulatory and supporting organizations (such as tax bureaus, 
state banks, and commercial administration bureaus), and trade associations who are your friends
Officials in the government, industrial bureaus, regulatory and supporting organizations (such as tax bureaus, 
state banks, and commercial administration bureaus), and trade associations who are your acquaintances
Managers at buyer firms, supplier firms, and competitor firms who are your friends
Managers at buyer firms, supplier firms, and competitor firms who are your acquaintances
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2. Among all network ties you mentioned in the previous question, approximately 
what percent of the total number was helpful in each of the following four functions? 
(Enter a number between 0% and 100%)  
3. Please rank each type of network tie in terms of its importance for improving your 
firm's performance (1-4: 1 is the most important, 4 is the least important). 
1. Demographic information 
2. Your gender 
3. Your age 
4. Your nationality 
 
5. If your nationality is not Chinese, how long have you been in China? 
Acquiring financial and physical capital
Acquiring human capital and knowledge
Obtaining more businesses
Obtaining licenses and certificates or passing routine 
inspections
Ties with officials who are your friends
Ties with managers at relevant firms who are your friends
Ties with officials who are your acquaintances
Ties with managers at relevant firms who are your acquaintances
 
11. Other Information
Your name:
Hotel name:
Address 1:
Address 2:
City/Town:
State/Province:
ZIP/Postal Code:
Email Address:
Phone Number:
Your age
Number of years
Male
 
nmlkj
Female
 
nmlkj
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6. How do you want to receive your incentives? (check one) 
Receive a Cornell University souvenir for sure
 
nmlkj
Be entered in a lottery to win ¥1,000 in cash (one winner for every 30 participants) nmlkj
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APPENDIX B 
 
Survey Instrument for Web-based Survey: Chinese Version 
Dissertation Chinese
您被邀请参加我的博士论文研究，这是一项关于经理人员的网络关系对饭店经营效益影响的研究。在您同意参加此项研
究前请仔细阅读此表格并询问任何有关的问题。 
 
关于此项研究的内容：此项研究的目的是考察在中国，经理的网络关系对饭店经营效益的影响是否因饭店所有制的不同
而有所差异。您必须是在2009年1月1日之前开始担任目前所在饭店的总经理方可参加本研究。 
 
您参加此研究需要做什么：如果您同意参加此研究，您将需要填写一份调研问卷。问卷的问题包括您的背景情况，您所
在饭店的经营效益情况和您的关系网络模式。填写整个问卷约需要20-25分钟。 
 
风险和收益：我认为参与本项研究不会给您带来任何超出日常生活中所能遇到的风险。 
 
研究结束后，我会向您提供一份研究结果报告。报告中将提供关于经济型饭店经理如何使用网络关系的情况，并将包括
何种关系组合分别对国有、民营和外资经济型饭店的经理更有效的结论。 
 
补偿：每位参与者将获得一件康奈尔大学的纪念品，或者参与抽奖以赢得1000元人民币的现金（每三十位参与抽奖者
中产生一名获奖者）。 
 
您的回答将对外保密：本项研究的记录将不对外公开。在公开发表的任何报告中，我保证其中不会包含有可以分辨出您
个人或所在具体饭店的信息。所有记录将被保存在上锁的文件柜中，只有研究者本人可以接触到原始材料。 
 
参与此研究完全自愿：参与本项研究完全出于本人自愿。尽管回答问卷中全部的问题会对我有更大的帮助，但您可以跳
过任何您不想回答的问题。如果您决定参与本研究，您仍可以随时决定退出。 
 
如果您有问题：开展本项研究的人员是刘赵平。请提出任何疑问。您如果在参与过程中有任何问题，请与刘赵平联系。
电子邮箱：ZL49@cornell.edu; 电话：001-607-2554921。国内电话：15810248468。如果您对于自己作为参与者的权
益有任何问题或担心，您可以和康奈尔大学的伦理审查委员会联系。电话：001-607-255-5138。或登录他们的网站：
http://www.irb.cornell.edu。 您也可以把您的担心或投诉匿名通过Ethicspoint反映或拨打（美国国内）免费电话1-866-
293-3077。Ethicspoint是一个负责沟通投诉人与大学关系的组织，所以可以保证整个过程是匿名的。 
 
您可以打印一份此表格作为档案记录。 
 
同意声明：我已经读过以上的信息，所有的问题也得到解答。我同意参与此项研究。 
 
调研人员姓名 （正楷书写）：刘赵平  
 
如果您同意参与，请在签名后点击“下一步”  
1. 签名 
1. 本饭店何时开始营业? 
 
1. 同意书
*
姓名
日期（年/月/日）
 
2. 经济型饭店及总经理的背景情况
何年（####）
何月 （1-12）
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2. 本饭店的所有制形式为 
3. 本饭店是否归属于某个饭店连锁集团 
1. 到2009年末，本饭店所归属的饭店连锁集团共在中国共有多少饭店？（如果您不知
道确切数字，你的最佳估计亦可） 
2. 请选择本饭店的管理模式 （四者选一） 
1. 下面哪种情况准确描述了本饭店的地理位置情况？（两者选一） 
2. 下面哪种情况准确描述了本饭店的地理位置情况？（两者选一） 
 
3. 经济型饭店及总经理的背景情况 (2)
饭店数量
 
4. 经济型饭店及总经理的背景情况 (3)
国有 nmlkj
民营 nmlkj
外资独资 nmlkj
中外合资 nmlkj
其它 (请注明) 
是 nmlkj
否 nmlkj
拥有或租赁（直营）（连锁集团拥有/租赁并直接经营） nmlkj
委托管理 （另一方拥有或租赁物业，但使用饭店连锁集团品牌并由连锁集团派出的管理团队经营） nmlkj
业主直接参与管理的特许经营 （由业主本人独立经营饭店但使用饭店集团的品牌） nmlkj
非业主管理的特许经营 （由业主雇佣的职业经理人独立经营管理但使用饭店集团的品牌） nmlkj
市区 nmlkj
郊区 nmlkj
位于交通干道旁边（单向双车道或双向四车道及以上） nmlkj
偏僻巷道（低于单向双车道或双向四车道） nmlkj
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3. 您拥有什么学历？ 
1. 您从事工作有多久？（多少年多少月） 
 
2. 您从事饭店业工作有多久？（多少年多少月） 
 
1. 在您开始目前的总经理工作之前，您共有几位家庭成员（指父母、配偶、兄弟姐妹
和子女）在饭店业工作过？ 
2. 在从事目前的工作之前，您共在多少个政府机关、事业单位或国有企业单位工作
过？ 
3. 请挑选1-3种您最常使用的社交网络网站/工具并且填写你在那些网站/工具上的朋友/
熟人数量 
 
5. 经济型饭店及总经理的背景情况 (4)
 
6. 经济型饭店及总经理的背景情况 (5)
饭店业家庭成员数量
政府机关数量
事业单位数量
国有企业数量
MSN即时通
Skype
QQ
Facebook
Linkedin
校内/人人
微博
博客
开心网
低于高中 nmlkj
高中学历 nmlkj
上过大学（但未毕业）或大专学历 nmlkj
大学本科学历 nmlkj
研究生及以上学历 nmlkj
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4. 就你在上个问题中挑选的1-3种社交网络网站/工具，请填写你一般每天在那些网站/工
具里所花费的时间（分钟数） 
1. 在2009年末，本饭店经营用客房共有多少间？ 
2. 2009年本饭店总营业收入是多少元？  
3. 2009年本饭店的全年售出房间总数为多少间？ 
4. 2009年本饭店净利润是多少元？ 
5. 2009年年初，本饭店资产总额为多少元？  
1. 请根据2009年和你们的直接竞争对手相比的情况给本饭店打分 
如何区分朋友和熟人？ 
 
熟人是指和你认识并且相互之间只有利益关系的人。一般来说，你无法主动选择开始或中断和熟人之间的联系（如同事
和邻居等），你们之间的情感紧密程度较低，你们之间的交往更多地考虑利益得失。 
 
MSN即时通
Skype
QQ
Facebook
Linkedin
校内/人人
微博
博客
开心网
 
7. 饭店经营业绩指标
客房数
总收入（元）
全年售出房间总数
净利润 （元）
饭店资产 （元）
 
8. 饭店经营业绩指标 （2）
 
最低 很低 低 一样 高 很高 最高
服务质量 nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
客户满意度 nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
出租率（如果没有数据，
你的最佳估计也可） nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
平均房价（如果没有数
据，你的最佳估计也可） nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
毛利润（如果没有数据，
你的最佳估计也可） nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
9. 总经理的关系网络使用模式
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朋友是指你从熟人当中主动选择加强交往而形成的关系。你和朋友之间利益关系和忘我的利他主义关系并存。你和朋友
之间的情感紧密程度较高，你们之间的交往更多地考虑情感交流，你和朋友之间的信任度也高于熟人。 
 
请选择2009年您在企业经营中使用个人关系网络来提高经营效益的程度 
 
1. 政府、行业主管部门、其他相关政府部门 （如税务、工商、国有银行等）和行业协
会中的朋友  
2. 供应商、客户和同行的管理人员中的朋友 
3. 政府、行业主管部门、其他相关政府部门 （如税务、工商、国有银行等）和行业协
会中的熟人  
4. 供应商、客户和同行的管理人员中的熟人  
1. 2009年，您的多少网络关系在提高饭店效益方面发挥过作用（请填入数字） 
2. 在您上个问题提到的全部网络关系当中，在以下的四项功能中发挥过作用的关系大
约各占总数的多大百分比？（请填入一个0% 到100%之间的数字） 
3. 请根据以下四种网络关系对提高企业经营效益的重要程度排序。（1为最重要，4为
最不重要） 
 
极少使用 极大量使用
政府官员中的朋友 nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
极少使用 极大量使用
企业管理人员当中的朋友 nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
极少使用 极大量使用
政府官员中的熟人 nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
极少使用 极大量使用
企业管理人员当中的熟人 nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj nmlkj
 
10. 总经理的关系网络使用模式 （2）
政府、行业主管部门、其他相关政府部门 （如税务、工商、国有银行等）和行业协会中的朋友
政府、行业主管部门、其他相关政府部门 （如税务、工商、国有银行等）和行业协会中的熟人
供应商、客户和同行的管理人员中的朋友
供应商、客户和同行的管理人员中的熟人
获取资金及有形资产
获取人力资源和知识
带来更多生意
帮助获得执照、证书及通过日常检查
政府官员中的朋友关系
与相关企业管理人员的朋友关系
政府官员中的熟人关系
与相关企业管理人员的熟人关系
 
11. 其它信息
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1. 个人联系方式 
2. 您的性别 
3. 您的年龄 
4. 您的国籍 
 
5. 如果您的国籍不是中国，那么，您到中国有多久了？（多少年） 
 
6. 您选择哪种获得奖品的方式？（两者选一） 
您的姓名 :
饭店名称 :
邮政地址 1:
邮政地址 2:
城市 /县 /镇 :
省 /市 /自治区 :
邮政编码 :
电子邮箱地址 :
电话号码 :
您的年龄
男 nmlkj
女 nmlkj
得到一件康奈尔大学的纪念品 nmlkj
参与抽奖赢得1,000元的现金 （获奖概率为三十分之一） nmlkj
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